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Abstract
The paper focuses on the relation between the analytical philosophy of science and
modular and holistic approaches to cognitive linguistics, respectively. The authors
show that Chomsky’s as well as Bierwisch & Lang’s and Lakoff & Johnson’s approaches
make substantial use of non-demonstrative inferences which the standard view of the
analytical philosophy of science evaluates as fallacies. By outlining a metatheoretical
framework focusing on plausible inferences, the authors argue that the inferences the
theories mentioned make use of are plausible rather than fallacious. This finding illu-
minates basic aspects of theory formation in linguistics and motivates the revaluation
of the methodological foundations of linguistic theories.
“Zwischen der Philosophie und den Wissenschaften herrschen seit gerau-
mer Zeit gestörte Verhältnisse; die Wissenschaftstheorie ist der moderne
Versuch, sie wieder ins Reine zu bringen. Das findet in der Regel weder
den Beifall der Wissenschaften, die ihren Abschied von der Philoso-
phie als Abschied von einer spekulativen Vergangenheit zu stilisieren
pflegen, noch den Beifall der Philosophie, sofern diese angesichts ihres
reichen klassischen Erbes dazu neigt, der wissenschaftstheoretischen As-
kese philosophische Armut zu bescheinigen. [. . .] Gegen diese Auffassung
wendet sich heute die Wissenschaftstheorie. In Form einer das wissen-
schaftliche Wissen analysierenden [. . .] Bemühung wird Wissenschaft
wieder zu einem philosophischen Thema und Philosophie wieder zu ei-
nem Element wissenschaftlichen Selbstverständnisses.”
(Mittelstraß 2004, 5–6; emphasis added)
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1. Introduction1
As Hilary Putnam showed in one of his seminal papers (Putnam 1962),
however diverse the analytical philosophy of science in the first half of
the twentieth century was, there was a set of assumptions which most
approaches shared. Putnam called this set of assumptions the “received
view” of the analytical philosophy of science. To put it in a very simplified
manner, some basic characteristics of the latter can be summarized as
follows:
(RV) The “received view” assumes, among other things, that
(a) scientific theories have to meet the standards of “rationality”;
(b) scientific theories have to be “deductive”, “empirical” and “explanatory”;
and
(c) there is a clear distinction between the process of scientific discovery (called
“the context of discovery”) and the form in which the results of discovery,
that is scientific theories, are presented (cf. “the context of justification”).2
It is the “received view” that has served as the basic methodological
standard in mainstream theoretical linguistics since the late fifties (see
e.g., Ringen 1975) and that has influenced the development of current
theoretical linguistics to a substantial extent. The best-known example
1 In the paper we will make extensive use of quotations. This is, admittedly, not a
very elegant way of arguing. Nevertheless, quotations will serve three important
purposes. Firstly, the scope of our paper does not permit a detailed presentation
of the theories it focuses on. Therefore, quotations will document our claims con-
cerning those aspects of the theories which are relevant from our point of view
but which cannot be introduced systematically. In such cases the quotations will
appear in the footnotes. Secondly, they simply summarize pieces of background
information which we will have to make use of as relevant steps within our line of
argumentation; in such cases they will be part of the main text. Thirdly, we will
argue against deeply rooted prejudices which most theoretical linguists share and
this undermines the picture most linguistic theories draw of themselves. This is,
of course, a risky enterprise. Thus, the quotations also serve the legitimization of
our approach in that they witness that our claims are well-motivated by the logi-
cal and argumentation-theoretical literature which, unfortunately, most linguists
are not familiar with.
Let us also remark that the present paper focuses on a possible application
of plausibility theory to the analysis of argumentation in linguistics. However,
plausibility theory is characterized, among other things, by a very vague termi-
nology (see also Walton 2001 on this). Therefore, basically we will use all notions
preexplicatively.
2 For a detailed discussion of the “received view” cf. Suppe (1977).
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of the impact of the “received view” on linguistics is, of course, generative
grammar. However, the proponents of most current linguistic theories
failed to notice the fact that the “received view” is anything but up
to date. Although, as well-known developments in the philosophy of
science witness, it has been “out” for several decades and no longer counts
as a serious alternative to current trends, the majority of theoretical
linguists still assumes its validity. For example, even the latest version
of generative linguistics accepts the scientific standards of the received
view.3 In this respect, the methodology of linguistics is far behind the
current state of the art in the philosophy of science. This situation is
especially interesting with respect to the so-called “cognitive turn” in
linguistics.4
It is instructive to observe that proponents of dominating approaches
to cognitive linguistics consider it important to characterize their ap-
proach by relating it to the “received view”. Accordingly, this relation
is treated as a relevant component of the definition of the approach at
issue. Basically, there are two extreme attitudes. On the one hand,
modular approaches to cognitive linguistics—for example Bierwisch and
Lang’s two-level model—explicitly conform to the analytical tradition
and, what is more, consider this as a major achievement.5 In addition,
3 “[. . .] a ‘naturalistic approach’ to the mind investigates mental aspects of the
world as we do any others, seeking to construct intelligible explanatory theories,
with the hope of eventual integration with the ‘core’ natural sciences.” (Chomsky
2000, 76; emphasis added)
4 The notions “cognitive linguistics” and “cognitive semantics” will be used preex-
plicatively, too. For a possible explication of these notions, see Kertész (2004a).
5 See the following quotation as an illustration:
“Was besagt die angedeutete Perspektive der kognitiven Wissenschaften
für das Verständnis linguistischer Fragestellungen? Der entscheidende
Punkt ist, daß die Linguistik von der im wesentlichen deskriptiven Ana-
lyse natürlicher Sprachen zur Formulierung erklärender Theorien über
ihren Gegenstandsbereich gelangt. Dieser Übergang von einer beschrei-
benden zu einer erklärenden Wissenschaft ist ein fundamentaler Wech-
sel in der Orientierung, auch wenn er sich schrittweise und nicht immer
leicht erkennbar vollzieht. Er verlangt die Aufdeckung und kontrollier-
bare Formulierung von Gesetzmäßigkeiten oder Prinzipien, denen die
Sprachkenntnis unterliegt, aus denen also ihre charakteristischen Eigen-
schaften abgeleitet werden können. In dem Maß, in dem solche Gesetz-
mäßigkeiten formuliert und begründet werden können, wird die kognitiv
orientierte Linguistik zu einer Disziplin, in der die in der Naturwissen-
schaft geltenden Grundsätze der Theoriebildung und Erklärung wirksam
werden.” (Bierwisch 1987, 646; emphasis added)
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this assumed progress is claimed to be inseparable from the success of
generative grammar.6 On the other hand, holistic approaches such as
the “second generation cognitive science” advocated by Lakoff and John-
son’s cognitive theory of metaphor fiercely reject the analytical standards
of scientific theory formation.7 This rejection of analytical philosophy is,
of course, accompanied by the rejection of generative grammar.
The fact that (i) the “received view” is an outworn conception within
the philosophy of science and (ii) many current linguistic theories still
accept it as a major methodological evaluation standard, suggests the
question whether these linguistic theories really behave in the ways they
declare. Do, for example, Chomsky’s generative linguistics or Bierwisch
and Lang’s two-level approach really meet the standards of the so-called
“received view” of the analytical philosophy of science, and, in turn, do
Lakoff and Johnson or Langacker really follow a scientific attitude that
radically differs from the methodology of the analytical tradition? This
is the question which the present paper centres around. However, such a
general and vaguely raised question is difficult to grasp. Therefore, so as
to obtain a more precise and more specific problem whose discussion may
lead to instructive findings, we will narrow it down in several respects.
Firstly, we will focus on the structure of inferences. The motivation
for this decision is that the “received view” presupposes the rationality
of scientific inquiry. Although within the analytical philosophy of science
there are different views concerning the question of what rationality is,
there seems to be agreement on the fact that one thing that rationality
involves is that the theses of a theory must be connected by valid log-
ical inferences, also known as demonstrative inferences.8 Consequently,
whether cognitive linguistic theories conform to the analytical tradition
6 For example:
“Es liegt mithin in der Natur der Sache, daß die Entwicklung der Linguis-
tik als kognitive Wissenschaft nicht von der der generativen Grammatik
zu trennen ist.” (Bierwisch 1987, 646)
7 “Philosophy is so much an implicit, though not always recognized, part of all intel-
lectual disciplines that it has determined, for many investigators, the conception
of what cognitive science is. There are at least two approaches to cognitive science
defined by different philosophical commitments: a first-generation cognitive sci-
ence that assumed most of the fundamental tenets of traditional Anglo-American
philosophy and a second generation that called most of those tenets into question
on empirical grounds.” (Lakoff–Johnson 1999, 75)
8 In accordance with the literature, we will treat the notions “demonstrative”,
“deductive” and “conclusive” as synonyms.
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or not, may be tested, among other things, by examining to what extent
they make use of demonstrative inferences.
Secondly, since both modular and holistic approaches to cognitive
linguistics define themselves relative to generative linguistics, we are jus-
tified in discussing the latter as well. Thus, we will examine three exam-
ples so as to give an idea of how inferences in cognitive linguistics work:
Chomsky’s generative linguistics, Bierwisch and Lang’s two-level model
as an example of modular cognitive linguistics compatible with gener-
ativism, and Lakoff and Johnson’s cognitive theory of metaphor as an
illustration of holistic cognitive linguistics which rejects generative gram-
mar in particular and the analytical philosophy of science in general.
Thirdly, in order to make our argumentation even more specific, we
will choose two problematic patterns of inference as instructive points
of departure. In particular, we will analyze applications of part-whole
and whole-part inferences. The question of how to reconstruct these pat-
terns of inference is controversial (see, e.g., van Eemeren–Grootendorst
1994; Kienpointner 1992, 277ff.; Woods–Walton 1989; Walton 1996 on
this problem). Nevertheless, for the present purposes and as a first ap-
proximation, the following simplified outline of their structure will be
sufficient.
(1) Part-whole inference
Premises:
(a) x is part of y
(b) x has the property P
Conclusion:
(c) y has the property P
(2) Whole-part inference
Premises:
(a) x is part of y
(b) y has the property P
Conclusion:
(c) x has the property P
Now the question arises as to how the “received view” of the analyti-
cal philosophy of science evaluates part-whole and whole-part inferences.
The reason the analysis of (1) and/or (2) may be instructive is that they
are non-demonstrative inferences. In the case of demonstrative inferences
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it is impossible that the conclusion is false while the premises are true.
Non-demonstrative inferences, however, do not guarantee the truth of the
conclusion on the basis of the premises. It is either the case that the con-
clusion need not be true although the premises are true,9 or the premises
are uncertain themselves and therefore the conclusion is uncertain, too.10
As we have already indicated, the “received view” presupposes what
Ralph H. Johnson calls “deductive chauvinism”:
“[. . .] validity is made the standard against which arguments are to be mea-
sured. [. . .] a serious problem with this conception is the underlying assump-
tion it makes about argumentation: that all argumentation is deductive in
nature.” (Johnson 1995, 111; emphasis added)
Consequently, according to the “received view”, all non-demonstrative
inferences should be evaluated as fallacies. See, for example, the following
definition of the notion of fallacy:
“An argument whose premises do not imply its conclusion is one whose con-
clusion could be false even if all of its premises are true. An argument that
fails in this [. . .] way is said to be fallacious, or to be a fallacy.”11
(Copi–Burgess-Jackson 1996, 96; emphasis as in the original and added)
Thus, from the fact that (i) (1) and (2) are non-demonstrative inferences
and (ii) all non-demonstrative inferences are considered to be fallacies,
it follows that these two patterns are to be considered as fallacious in-
ferences, too. Therefore, according to the standards of rationality which
the “received view” of the analytical philosophy of science assumes, they
must not play a significant role in the structure of scientific theories.
However, what makes this finding especially interesting is that—as
we will show in section 2—Chomsky’s generative linguistics, Bierwisch
and Lang’s two-level approach and Lakoff and Johnson’s cognitive theory
of metaphor do make use of (1) and (2) irrespective of how these theories
9 Let us illustrate this with respect to pattern (1). If (a) David Beckham’s head is
round, and (b) David Beckham’s head is part of his body, then (c) David Beck-
ham’s body is round. Obviously, (a) and (b) are true, while (c) need not be true.
10 Cf. for example shaded modus tollens in Tables 1 and 2 in section 3.5.
11 “This criterion, in effect, means that any argument that is not deductively valid
[. . .] is a fallacious argument. It would mean, for example, that all arguments
that are inductively strong but not deductively valid are fallacious. And it would
mean that all arguments that have a weight of presumption in their favor, but
are not deductively valid [. . .] arguments, are fallacious arguments.” (Walton
1992a, 236)
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define their own relation to the “received view” of the analytical philos-
ophy of science. This finding leads to a highly problematic conclusion.
Namely, on the one hand, all of the three theories violate the commonly
accepted standards of the “received view” of the analytical philosophy
of science which during the past five decades or so have been used as
the basic methodological evaluation standard of linguistic theories. That
this is so is quite natural with respect to holistic cognitive linguistics, but
definitively counterintuitive in the case of the other two theories. Since
the latter implicitly presuppose the standards of rationality advocated
by the “received view” of the analytical philosophy of science, it follows
that they violate their own standards. Therefore, if we accept the prin-
ciples of rationality that the “received view” of the analytical philosophy
of science maintains, all three theories should be rejected. However, such
a decision would be fatal, because it leads to destructive consequences:
in fact, there is no doubt that all three theories are successful enterprises
widely applied by scientific communities, although, of course, different
ones. Thus we obtain a dilemma:12
(D) We either maintain three linguistic theories which seem to violate the commonly
accepted standards of rationality in the sense of (RV), or we reject them, although
they are workable and successful.
Accordingly, we may reduce the problem outlined to the following more
specific one:
(P) How can the dilemma (D) be solved?
The aim of the paper is to give an answer to (P) by arguing for the
tenability of the hypothesis (H):
12 In the present paper it would be beside the point to take sides between the
three theories. We simply consider it to be a fact (in whatever sense) that all
three theories are maintained by certain scientific communities and do not ask
the question which of them is “better” or “true”. Our task is to capture this
fact, among others by trying to resolve (D), and not to compare the theories.
Moreover, by “successful” and “workable” we mean the heuristic potential of
theories: namely, their capability of solving the problems they tackle by using
their own means and/or their capability of raising new problems which can be
captured by the same means or which, alternatively, give rise to approaches going
beyond the scope of the theory at issue.
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(a)(H) On the one hand, the account of inferences that the “received view” of the
analytical philosophy of science presupposes can be replaced by another ap-
proach which considers (1) and (2) as legitimate tools of scientific theorizing.
(b) On the other hand, this approach does not result in the strict rejection of
the standards of rationality in the sense of (RV); rather, it extends them in
so far as it distinguishes between two kinds of non-demonstrative inferences,
namely, plausible and fallacious ones.
We will proceed as follows. In section 2 we will briefly present a very sim-
ple analysis of the way basic notions of Chomsky’s theory of language, the
central empirical hypothesis of the two-level approach and that of the cog-
nitive theory of metaphor can be inferred from the premises they assume
via (1) and (2). In section 3 we will outline some of the main tenets of a
theory of plausible reasoning. We will show that the difference between
plausible inferences and fallacies is basically context-dependent: whereas
plausible inferences are effective tools of scientific problem solving in a
given context of argumentation, fallacies are ineffective or even destruc-
tive. Therefore, in section 4 we will argue that the application of (1)
and (2) is effective in the context of the three theories at issue, and that,
consequently, these patterns are not to be seen as fallacies, but rather,
as plausible inferences fulfilling important heuristic functions. Finally, in
section 5 the findings will be summarized and far reaching conclusions
concerning the nature of theory formation in linguistics will be drawn.
Already at this point it should be clear for the reader that we will be
discussing inferences not from the point of view of logic, but from that
of argumentation theory.
2. On the use of (1) and (2)
2.1. The problem
So as to make our line of thought as clear as possible, we will subdivide
our main problem (P) into a series of sub-problems corresponding to
the steps we summarized at the end of the previous section. We expect
that through solving these sub-problems eventually we will be capable of
arriving at (H). Accordingly, the first question we have to ask is this:
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(P1) Do Chomsky’s generative linguistics, the two-level approach and Lakoff and
Johnson’ cognitive theory of metaphor make use of (1) and (2)?13
2.2. Generative linguistics
In an ingenious paper Forrai puts forward the claim that Chomsky’s phi-
losophy of man is rooted in the notions of creativity, freedom and con-
straints (Forrai 1987, 50).14 This means that Chomsky considers man to
act freely within the constraints of his biological constitution. Moreover,
Chomsky infers basic claims of his theory of language from this view of
man by the use of a specific kind of non-demonstrative inference:
“How does this view of human nature connect to the study of language? The
connection might have been set up by Chomsky’s definition of the subject of
linguistics. Linguistics is assumed to be the science of the idealized native
speaker’s linguistic competence. This definition may give rise to a very
special kind of analogical reasoning, which can be schematically described
as follows: Premise 1: P is a part of w. Premise 2: w has the property
A. Conclusion: P has property A1, which is similar to property A. It is
a non-demonstrative inference from a property of the whole to the property
of the part. Chomsky’s definition of the subject of linguistics establishes
whole-part relationship between man and his linguistic competence. As a
result, it facilitates inference from the properties of human nature to the
properties of linguistic competence. Consequently, ideas about human nature
may infiltrate into linguistic theory. What I will try to show is that the birth
of some of Chomsky’s linguistic ideas might be explained in this way.”
(Ibid.; emphasis added)
13 We deliberately chose the examples to be discussed along the lines of the following
considerations. Firstly, precise analyses of reasoning are highly complex and
lengthy; therefore, to keep our own line of thought within the frames of the
present paper, we chose very simple examples which serve illustrative purposes
and are not claimed to be precise argumentation analyses. For detailed case
studies of plausible reasoning in linguistics, see e.g., Kertész (2004b), Kertész–
Rákosi (2005a;b), Rákosi (2005). Secondly, it is also important to exemplify that
the reasoning patterns we are examining can be used for very different purposes in
the three theories—e.g., for connecting the philosophical foundations of a given
theory with its central notions, or for inferring the main empirical hypothesis
of the theory, or for carrying out analyses of linguistic data. In this respect,
our examples are deliberately heterogeneous. Thirdly, contrasting the two-level
approach and generative linguistics (which accept the modularity hypothesis)
on the one hand with the cognitive theory of metaphor (which pleads for the
holistic hypothesis) on the other hand, exemplifies that even opposing empirical
hypotheses may be built on the same patterns of inference.
14 Forrai’s paper is also discussed in Kertész (2004b), although in a different meta-
theoretical framework.
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Obviously, the structure of this inference corresponds to (2). Forrai shows
that the application of the non-demonstrative inference mentioned leads
to a series of notions which are in the centre of Chomsky’s theory of
language. The reconstruction of this inference is as follows:
(3) Premises:
(a) Linguistic competence is part of human nature.
(b) Human nature has the property P .
Conclusion:
(c) Linguistic competence has the property P ′, where P ′ is similar to P (or even
identical with it).
Depending on what properties P and P ′ stand for, a series of further
inferences are carried out. Firstly, the property at issue is regularity.
Accordingly, the particular inference is this:
(4) Premises:
(a) Linguistic competence is part of human nature.
(b) In human behaviour regularity prevails.
Conclusion:
(c) In linguistic competence regularity prevails.
Secondly, creativity is considered to be a major property of human nature
as well as of linguistic competence. Now we can reconstruct the structure
of the inference as follows:
(5) Premises:
(a) Linguistic competence is part of human nature.
(b) Creativity is a fundamental property of human nature.
Conclusion:
(c) Creativity is a fundamental property of linguistic competence.
Thirdly, since creativity presupposes rules, the following inference presents
itself:
(6) Premises:
(a) Linguistic competence is part of human nature.
(b) Human nature is governed by rules.
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Conclusion:
(c) Linguistic competence is governed by rules.
The fourth case concerns constraints. That is:
(7) Premises:
(a) Linguistic competence is part of human nature.
(b) Human nature is characterized by biological constraints.
Conclusion:
(c) Linguistic competence is characterized by biological constraints.
Fifthly, the structure of the inference underlying Chomsky’s views of
language acquisition can be reconstructed in this way:
(8) Premises:
(a) Language acquisition is part of human nature.
(b) Human nature is characterized by the fact that man creates freely within
the constraints of his biological nature.
Conclusion:
(c) Language acquisition is characterized by the fact that man creates freely
within the constraints of his biological nature.
Finally, Forrai mentions the evaluation measure of grammars. The re-
construction of the inference Forrai refers to is as follows:
(9) Premises:
(a) Linguistic competence is part of human nature.
(b) Human nature is characterized by systematicity.
(c) Systematicity is similar to simplicity.
Conclusion:
(d) Linguistic competence is characterized by simplicity.
So, relying on Forrai’s considerations, we have seen that some of the major
ideas which govern Chomsky’s theory of language can be reconstructed
as the conclusions of whole-part inferences in the sense of (2).
However, the situation is more intricate than we have assumed so
far. In particular, Forrai starts his paper with the remark that although
Chomsky himself never appeals to his political views so as to justify his
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linguistic theory, it may be assumed that there is an indirect relationship
between his political philosophy and his linguistic programme. In fact,
it seems to be the case that both his linguistic and his political ideas are
rooted in his views of man. That this assumption is not totally mistaken,
can be documented by many passages in Chomsky’s writings. For ex-
ample, his reply to Mitsou Ronat’s question concerning the relationship
between his political and linguistic objectives is as follows:
“If there is a connection, it is on a rather abstract level. [. . .] There is no
very direct connection between my political activities, writing and others,
and the work bearing on language structure, though in some measure they
perhaps derive from certain common assumptions and attitudes with regard
to basic aspects of human nature.” (Chomsky 1979, 3; emphasis added)
Interestingly enough, we may assume that this relation rests on a part-
whole inference which is the inverse of the whole-part inference discussed
so far and which corresponds to the pattern introduced in (1). That is,
man is part of society and Chomsky infers basic properties of society
from basic properties of human nature:
(10) Premises:
(a) Man is part of society.
(b) Man has the property P .
Conclusion:
(c) Society has the property P ′, where P ′ is similar to or identical with P .
This general pattern is realized in the following specific inferences:
(11) Premises:
(a) Man is part of society.
(b) Man is characterized by creativity.
Conclusion:
(c) Society is characterized by creativity.
(12) Premises:
(a) Man is part of society.
(b) Man is characterized by biological constraints.
Conclusion:
(c) Society is characterized by biological constraints.
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(13) Premises:
(a) Man is part of society.
(b) Man is characterized by freedom within constraints.
Conclusion:
(c) Society is characterized by freedom within constraints.
society 
man 
linguistic competence 
regularity  
creativity 
rules 
etc.
Fig. 1
In sum, we have seen two things. Firstly, Chomsky’s views of man consti-
tute the premises of two inferences pointing in opposite directions; the re-
lationship between these two kinds of inferences is visualized in Figure 1.
Secondly, both the philosophical foundations of his theory of language
and his theory of society are closely related to the use of (1) and (2).
2.3. The two-level approach
The modularity hypothesis was introduced into linguistic theories in
many different ways. The core of these diverse accounts is the follow-
ing assumption:
(14) Knowledge of language is organized in a modular way.
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The relevance of (14) is rooted, among other things, in the fact that it
constitutes one premise of the central argument for the assumption that
cognition as a whole is modularly organized (see also Kertész 2004a).15
This inference leads to a very strong empirical hypothesis, but is, nev-
ertheless, in most cases only applied implicitly. Then from (14) we can
infer (15c) on the basis of (1):
(15) Premises:
(a) Knowledge of language is part of human cognitive behaviour.
(b) Knowledge of language is organized in a modular way.
15 The argument, which leads from (14) to the modularity of cognition, is concisely
summarized in the following quotation:
“Historisch gesehen, entwickelte sich die entscheidende Argumentation
von der Autonomie zur Modularität. Chomsky zeigte zunächst, daß na-
türliche Sprachen über Eigenschaften verfügen, die ein Kind nur dann
unter den üblichen Bedingungen erwerben kann, wenn bestimmte die-
sen Eigenschaften zugrundeliegende Prinzipien nicht erlernt werden
müssen, sondern bereits in der Struktur des Kognitionssystems ver-
ankert sind [. . .]. Da diese Prinzipien in keiner erkennbaren Weise auf
Prinzipien anderer kognitiver Bereiche, wie etwa Perzeption oder Be-
griffsbildung zurückgeführt werden können [. . .], müssen sie in ihrer
sprachspezifischen Form kognitiv verankert sein. Wenn dies so ist, folgt
logischerweise die Modularitätsthese, d.h. unser Kognitionssystem muß
zumindest zwei autonome Module enthalten, und zwar das Grammatik-
modul und ein Modul, das alle übrigen kognitiven Funktionen umfaßt.
Da weiterhin Evidenz dafür vorliegt, daß auch für die (visuelle) Wahr-
nehmung ein eigenes autonomes Modul anzusetzen ist [. . .], gewinnt die
Modularitätshypothese zunehmend an Plausibilität.”
(Fanselow –Felix 1987, 174; emphasis added)
Fodor’s (1983) argument seems to have a similar structure:
“Unabhängig von der Bewertung der einzelnen Beobachtung ist Fodor
sicher zuzugestehen, daß er an einer Fülle von Beispielen erfolgreich de-
monstriert hat, daß perzeptuelle und sprachliche Prozesse im Kontext
der Gesamtkognition des Menschen eine Sonderstellung einnehmen. Sie
weisen Gesetzmäßigkeiten und Eigenschaften auf, die in anderen kogni-
tiven Domänen nicht auftreten. Unter diesem Aspekt scheint die Auffas-
sung eines globalen, alles umfassenden Kognitionssystems, das visuelle
Perzeption und sprachliche Kodierung mit den gleichen Mechanismen
und Strategien bewältigt wie das Lösen einer Mathematikaufgabe oder
den Zusammenbau einer Maschine, wenig plausibel zu sein.”
(Fanselow –Felix op.cit., 273)
Clearly, in both quotations the argument rests on a part-whole inference corre-
sponding to (1) which is a frequently used problem-solving strategy in cognitive
science.
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Conclusion:
(c) Human cognitive behaviour is organized in a modular way.
As illustrated in the last footnote, in the literature (15c) is inferred not
only from (14) by using (1), but from (16) and (1) as well:
(16) Visual perception is organized in a modular way.
(15c) is the main empirical hypothesis of modularism in general and the
two-level approach in particular.16 Nevertheless, Bierwisch and Lang
use this conclusion as one of the premises of further inferences which
are expected to yield the existence of specific autonomous subsystems.
They focus on “semantic form” which is assumed to be the interface
between the grammatical and the conceptual module. Thus they argue
by making use of (2):
(17) Premises:
(a) The grammatical system/the conceptual system/semantic form is part of
human cognitive behaviour.
(b) Human cognitive behaviour is organized in a modular way.
Conclusion:
(c) The grammatical system/the conceptual system/semantic form is organized
in a modular way.
By way of summary, (1) and (2) constitute the means of inferring the
central empirical hypotheses of the two-level-approach.
16 “Basically, all human cognitive behaviour is organized in a modular fashion. The
structure formation underlying any concrete behaviour performance is based upon
the integration of various relatively autonomous, task-specifically interacting sys-
tems and subsystems (modules). Language, the different modes of perception,
and the conceptual organisation of experience make up such systems, which for
their part are again structured in a modular way. The aim to be derived from this
assumption is to identify systems, to analyze their structure and organisation in
the attempt to capture the rationale behind their interaction.” (Lang et al. 1991;
emphasis added)
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2.4. The cognitive theory of metaphor17
Unlike (14), the holistic hypothesis assumes that knowledge of language
cannot be subdivided into relatively autonomous systems and subsys-
tems:
(18) Knowledge of language is a unified (holistic) system.
Among other things, holistic cognitive linguistics aims at the empirical
reformulation, solution or elimination of classic philosophical questions
concerning the nature of mind and knowledge (see e.g., Lakoff–Johnson
1999, 8). Against this background Lakoff and Johnson raise a series of
classic philosophical problems to which they propose empirical solutions
within the framework of their embodied realism. For example, they touch
on the problem of Zeno’s Arrow (Lakoff–Johnson op.cit., 157). As is
well-known, the problem of the Arrow is rooted in Zeno’s assumption
according to which time is a sequence constituting a time line. Now, if
we imagine the flight of an arrow, then at any point in time, the arrow
is assumed to be at some fixed location. At a later point, its location
is at another fixed point. That is, the arrow is located at a single fixed
point each time. Thus, Zeno concludes that there is no motion and time
is not divided up into instants.
In the light of this formulation, Zeno’s classic standpoint is this:
(a)(19) Classic philosophical problem: Is there motion?
(b) Classic philosophical solution: There is no motion, because at any point of
time the arrow is at some fixed location.
Lakoff and Johnson specify the task of their own version of cognitive
linguistics as follows:
“The meaning of any philosophical question depends on what conceptual sys-
tem is being used to comprehend the question. That is an empirical issue,
an issue to be taken up by cognitive science in general and cognitive seman-
tics in particular. [. . .] The same is the case for any proposed answer. An
answer to a question like ‘What is time?’ is given relative to a philosoph-
ical conceptual system in which that answer is a meaningful answer. Such
a philosophical conceptual system is part of the conceptual system of the
philosophers doing the inquiry. The conceptual systems of philosophers are
17 The following considerations are also discussed in Kertész (2004a) in a different
context.
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no more consciously accessible than those of anyone else. To understand
what counts as a meaningful answer, one must study the conceptual sys-
tems of the philosophers engaged in that inquiry. That too is an empirical
question for cognitive science and cognitive semantics.”
(op.cit., 136; italics as in the original and bold emphasis added)
The implicit argumentation underlying this quotation can be reconstruc-
ted in the following way:
(20) Premises:
(a) “a philosophical conceptual system is part of the conceptual system of the
philosophers doing the inquiry,” and
(b) the conceptual system of the philosophers doing the inquiry belongs to the
subject matter of cognitive semantics.
Conclusion:
(c) A philosophical conceptual system belongs to the subject matter of cognitive
semantics.
Lakoff and Johnson’s solution to Zeno’s problem uses a second inference
as well:
(21) Premises:
(a) “a philosophical conceptual system is part of the conceptual system of the
philosophers doing the inquiry,”
(b) the conceptual system of the philosophers doing the inquiry is a human
conceptual system, and
(c) “the human conceptual system is metaphorically structured” (Lakoff–Johnson
1980, 6).
Conclusion:
(d) A philosophical conceptual system is metaphorically structured.
Thus, these inferences clearly rest on (2). From (20c) and (21d) it follows
that it is the metaphorical structure of Zeno’s conceptual system which
is responsible for the problem of the Arrow. Therefore, this metaphor-
ical structure needs to be revealed. The conceptual metaphor which is
assumed to play a constitutive role in the structure of such a conceptual
system is one that may be called the Moving Observer Metaphor (Lakoff
–Johnson 1999, 146):
(22) locations on observer’s path of motion are times
the motion of the observer is the “passage” of time
the distance moved by the observer is the amount of time “passed”
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This metaphor implies that “what we will encounter in the future is what
we are moving towards”, “what we are encountering now is what we are
moving by”, and “what we encountered in the past is what we moved
past” (Lakoff–Johnson op.cit., 152). It is the identification of the Moving
Observer Metaphor that yields the empirical solution to the problem of
the Arrow.18
That is:
(a)(23) Empirical reformulation of the classic philosophical problem:
Is there motion, if
– there is a part in the brain that detects motion, and
– our motion detectors identify the arrow as moving?
(b) Empirical solution to the empirical problem:
There is motion, because
– our brains give us multiple ways of perceiving and conceptualizing the
world and, within the latter, motion as well,
– we have a literal and a metaphorical way of conceptualizing motion,
– (19b) is false, because Zeno made the mistake of taking the Moving Ob-
server metaphor to be literal.
18 “[. . .] In our terms, the idea that time is a linear sequence of points is metaphor-
ical, a consequence of times seen as locations in the Moving Observer metaphor.
The mistake, once again, is to take what is metaphorical as literal. Incidentally,
a cognitive response to Zeno’s paradox of the arrow is simple. There is a part
of the brain that detects motion. Our motion detectors identify the arrow as
moving. That is, our brains give us multiple ways of perceiving and conceptu-
alizing the world. Motion is not a metaphorical concept. The idea that time a
linear sequence of finite points is [sic]. Our direct nonmetaphorically structured
experience provides a simple response: Of course the arrow is moving. But in
addition, we have an unconscious metaphorical conceptualization of instants of
time as locations in space. We use this, for example, when we comprehend a pic-
ture of a moving object at a time: ‘This is Sam driving by directly in front of our
house at 10:06 p.m.’ In other words, we have more than one way to conceptualize
motion—one literal and one metaphorical. We can conceptualize motion directly,
as when we think of Sam driving by and the hands of the clock moving. We can
also conceptualize motion using a metaphorical conceptualization of time as a
line with point locations on it. In the metaphor, and only in the metaphor, there
is temporal location. Relative to the metaphor, we can fix a point location in
time. Within the metaphor, at that point location, there can be no motion, since
motion can only occur over regions of time in the metaphor. The appearance of
paradox comes from attributing real existence to metaphorical point locations.
Zeno’s brilliance was to concoct an example that forced a contradiction upon us:
literal motion and motion metaphorically conceptualized as a sequence of fixed
locations at fixed points in time.” (Lakoff – Johnson op.cit., 157–8; emphasis as
in the original)
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Thus we have seen how the use of (2) facilitates the solution of a problem
raised in Lakoff and Johnson’s approach.
2.5. Summary
The considerations put forward and illustrated by the above examples boil
down to the following claim to be considered as an auxiliary hypothesis
which is the answer to (P1) and which corresponds to one of the stages
in the argumentation whose result will be (H):
(H1) Chomsky’s generative linguistics, the two-level approach and Lakoff and John-
son’s theory do make use of (1) and (2).
As already mentioned, (H1) clearly motivates the dilemma (D) we raised
in section 1. One way to handle (H1) would be, of course, to reject all
of the three approaches, because they make substantial use of patterns
of inference which the “received view” of the analytical philosophy of
science considers to be invalid. Nevertheless, as we have mentioned, such
a decision would be unreasonable, because it would lead to the rejection
of theories which otherwise are undoubtedly workable and successful.
So, let us consider another possible solution already put forward in
(H): namely, the claim that it is not the theories at issue which are ille-
gitimate, but rather, it is the principles of rationality presupposed by the
“received view” of the analytical philosophy of science that may be ques-
tioned. This second way of treating the problem is not unmotivated at
all: in fact, recent investigations into the nature of scientific inquiry have
shown that although strict logical validity may be a reasonable require-
ment in certain contexts, in many relevant cases it cannot be realized in
scientific practice.
Accordingly, we will outline an approach whose aim is to capture
certain aspects of this state of affairs. We will have to show three things:
(i) In contrast to (RV) (see section 1), not all non-demonstrative
inferences are fallacies.
(ii) In the context of the theories at issue (1) and (2) are non-
fallacious non-demonstrative inferences.
(iii) In particular, it is possible to distinguish between two sorts of
non-demonstrative inferences, namely, plausible inferences and fallacies.
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3. Preliminaries to a theory of plausible reasoning
3.1. The problem
As is well known, the “received view” of the analytical philosophy of sci-
ence maintains that the “context of discovery”—that is the process of
problem solving—is beyond the scope of rationality and cannot therefore
be captured by the philosophy of science (see (RVc)). In contrast, it is
the “context of justification”—that is the reconstruction of the logical
structure of well-developed theories—which constitutes the subject mat-
ter of the philosophy of science, because it is only the presentation of fully
developed theories that is expected to follow the principles of rationality.
However, during the 1970’s the distinction between the “context of
discovery” and the “context of justification” was seriously questioned
(Nickles 1980; 2001). The focus of interest changed gradually for philoso-
phers of science: the processes of theory development also became an
interesting research topic beside the justification of theories. In fact, the
distinction between the two phases has been largely given up. This shift
of emphasis had several independent sources.
Firstly, in many empirical disciplines the exposition of the results
of research also reflects the way the corresponding problems were solved
and remains strongly argumentative in nature. In this case very often
even the final form in which the results are presented makes substantial
use of non-demonstrative rather than demonstrative inferences. Mainly
due to the pioneering work of Polya and Rescher, the assumption was
formulated that in empirical disciplines it is plausibility considerations
rather than strict logical validity that play a central role. Accordingly, the
philosopher of science has to go beyond those purely formal considerations
which demonstrative inferences permit and enter the realm of plausible
reasoning.
Secondly, the role which inconsistency plays in scientific inquiry was
acknowledged. From the seventies on different attempts to handle incon-
sistency by developing different approaches to paraconsistent logics were
made (for recent overviews, see e.g., Meheus 2002 and Bremer 2005).
Thirdly, the development of artificial intelligence research gave rise to
views which considered scientific inquiry as a process of problem-solving
to be modelled by heuristics based on computer programmes.
In spite of the fact that these tendencies emerged independently of
each other, they point in the same direction: some basic tenets of the
“received view” of the analytical philosophy of science with respect to in-
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ferences in scientific theories are no longer acceptable. The central notions
which may outline a new perspective are “problem solving”, “discovery”,
“plausible inferences” and “inconsistency”. On this background, it is
fully legitimate to hypothesize that it is plausible inferences that might
provide us the key to capturing these phenomena.
Although the pioneering activity of George Polya and Nicholas Re-
scher showed convincingly the relevance of plausible inferences and re-
vealed basic aspects of their structure and functioning, and although
these achievements have been unquestionably acknowledged, the individ-
ual sciences have not paid as much attention to them as they deserve:19
“Plausible reasoning is pervasive in daily life as well as in scientific activity.
While inductive reasoning and probabilistic thinking have been the object
of much interest among psychologists for a long time, the frequent case where
people process uncertain premises and draw an uncertain conclusion [. . .] has
remained relatively neglected. This is so despite the recognition of its impor-
tance by logicians and mathematicians [. . .] (Rescher 1976) and by philoso-
phers [. . .] and the development of non-monotonic reasoning formalisms in
Artificial Intelligence.” (Politzer–Bourmaud 2002, 346; emphasis added)
According to the literature, non-demonstrative inferences include, for
instance, inductive, analogical, abductive, defeasible, presumptive and
plausible inferences. However, there is no generally accepted interpreta-
tion of these terms. This results in a kind of terminological vagueness
which we have to live with. For example, in certain cases the term “plausi-
ble inferences” is treated as the genus proximum of inductive, analogical
and other sorts of non-demonstrative inferences and excludes only fal-
lacies from plausible reasoning. In other cases plausible inferences are
considered to form a special class within non-demonstrative inferences as
alternatives to inductive, analogical and abductive inferences. Following
Polya and Rescher, we will maintain the standpoint mentioned first.20
Since the scope of the present paper does not permit the discussion of
the arguments for this decision, let us mention that D. Walton, J. R. Jo-
sephson and S. G. Josephson seem to argue for the same view as well.21
In what follows we will show that Polya’s and Rescher’s ideas can be
developed into a coherent approach to plausible inferences and fallacies
19 Although Polya’s and Rescher’s ideas were published a couple of decades ago, they
are still up to date. See e.g., Woods et al. (2000, 258), Walton (2001; 1992b),
Chesñevar et al. (2000), etc.
20 Cf. Polya (1954, Preface), Rescher (1976).
21 Cf. Walton (2001).
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which differs from the “received view” in several respects. So as to put
forward our approach, we will focus on the following question:
(P2) What are plausible inferences, that is, how can they be distinguished from
(a) demonstrative inferences on the one hand,
and
(b) fallacies on the other hand?
It is worth illustrating the nature of the problem by an instructive ex-
ample. Traditionally it is assumed that one of the classical fallacies is
“affirming the consequent” which can be contrasted with the valid in-
ference form of modus tollens on the left. The main difference between
the two inference patterns, in this view, is that while modus tollens is
deductively valid, the inference pattern on the right is invalid although
it seems to be correct, because it resembles modus tollens.
A implies B
B false
A false
A implies B
B true
A true
It is instructive to observe that the very same pattern on the right is
considered by Polya (1948, 221) not as a fallacy, but as the paradigm
example of plausible inferences called “reduction” which he treats as the
simplest and most frequently used pattern of plausible reasoning. Let us
compare the traditional characterization of the pattern on the right side
of the above table with Polya’s considerations:22
“[. . .] let us consider the ‘modus tollens’ of the ‘hypothetical syllogism’ [. . .]:
A implies B
B false
A false
Even from a quite primitive standpoint, we can see various remarkable fea-
tures in this pattern of reasoning: it is impersonal, universal, self-sufficient,
and definitive. [. . .] Let us compare the pattern of demonstrative reasoning
(the ‘modus tollens’) [. . .] with the pattern of plausible reasoning [. . .]:
22 The situation is even more complex. For example, just to mention one aspect,
because the pattern at issue is also held to be a typical example of abduction. We
cannot go into a discussion of the relationship between abductive and plausible
inferences. See Walton (2001) for a concise overview.
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A implies B
B true
A more credible
Between these two patterns, the ‘demonstrative’ and the ‘plausible’, there
is a certain outward similarity. (The demonstrative is traditional, and the
other has been fashioned after it, of course.) Yet let us compare them more
thoroughly.
Both patterns have the same first premise
A implies B
The second premises
B false B true
are just opposite, but they are equally clear and definite; they are on the
same logical level. Yet there is a great difference between the two conclusions
A false A more credible
[. . .] The conclusion of the demonstrative pattern is on the same level as
the premises, but the conclusion of our pattern of plausible reasoning is of
different nature, less sharp, less fully expressed.”
(Polya 1954, 112–3; emphasis as in the original)
The comparison shows that Polya’s (and following him, Rescher’s) main
idea is that although in certain non-demonstrative inferences it is not
the case that the conclusion is true whenever the premises are true, the
latter may contribute to the credibility of the former. That is, the pattern
called “affirming the consequent” is traditionally considered as a fallacy,
because it is deductively not valid. Polya claims that the same pattern
leads to a credible conclusion and therefore, although not deductively
valid, it is fully legitimate.
In a similar vein, Walton argues that purely formal considerations
are not enough to differentiate between correct and fallacious arguments:
“Many of the so-called fallacies, on closer inspection, turn out to be instances
of argumentation that are defeasible, or opinion-based cases of presumptive
reasoning, but inherently reasonable.” (Walton 1991, 216; emphasis added)
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Accordingly, if it is only the form of inferences that is focused on, then one
excludes inferences from the legitimate tools of reasoning which are (in
whatever sense) “inherently reasonable” in spite of being non-demonstra-
tive. Therefore, one of the difficulties of answering the questions in (P2)
is that the distinction between demonstrative, plausible and fallacious
inferences cannot rest solely on the form of inferences. Consequently, in
what follows we will show how (P2) can be solved if the examination of
inferences is not restricted to their formal aspects.
3.2. On (P2a): plausible and demonstrative inferences23
Comparing the demonstrative inference with the plausible one mentioned
in the last quotation by Polya, we may observe that while with demon-
strative inferences the truth of the conclusion follows from the truth of the
premises with certainty, the premises of plausible inferences contribute
only to the credibility of the conclusion. That is, firstly, as opposed to the
certainty of demonstrative inferences, plausible inferences are uncertain
and fallible (Polya 1948, 221; Walton 2001, 159, etc.).
Secondly, demonstrative (i.e., logically valid) inferences cannot lead
to knowledge that goes beyond the information content of the premises.
In contrast to this, plausible inferences are frequently used effective tools
of acquiring new knowledge in mathematics, scientific inquiry and every-
day life (Polya ibid.), because their conclusion may contain information
not included in the premises.24
Thirdly, this kind of effectivity is closely connected to their heuristic
function. As is well-known, demonstrative inferences are not suitable for
bringing about decisions between alternative solutions to a given problem
23 For more detailed discussions of our approach to plausible inferences with special
focus on inconsistency, see Kertész (2004b), Kertész – Rákosi (2005b), Rákosi
(2005). The following considerations are a brief summary of section 2 in Kertész –
Rákosi (2005c).
24 Cf. Ruzsa (2000, 17):
“Knowledge obtained by logical inference is only relatively new: it must
have been hidden in the premises, because otherwise it could not be
the strict logical consequence of our premises. [. . .] It is impossible to
gain totally new knowledge by logical inference.”
However, it is important to remark that although the information content of the
conclusion of a demonstrative inference cannot go beyond that of the premises, it
makes implicit information explicit. This is one of the reasons why demonstrative
inferences may be used for the solution of problems.
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which mutually exclude each other, but each of which is motivated by
certain considerations with respect to the information available.25 In this
respect, too, they differ significantly from plausible inferences, because
the latter help us make decisions between alternatives on the basis of
plausibility considerations. Accordingly, plausible inferences contribute
to the solution of the problems raised (Polya 1948, 102f; Polya 1954, 140f;
Walton 2001, 164).26
Fourthly, they are dynamic, because the conclusion of a plausible
inference changes monotonically whenever one of its premises changes
monotonically, and because such a change is continuous as well (Polya
1954, 26, 41; cf. also Walton 2001, 161). Therefore, there is a close
relationship between plausible and demonstrative inferences:27
“[. . .] our pattern of plausible inference has a ‘limiting form’, which is a
pattern of demonstrative inference. As the premises of the plausible infer-
ence ‘tend’ to the corresponding premises of the limiting form, the plau-
sible conclusion ‘approaches’ its extreme limiting strength. Still shorter:
there is a continuous transition from the heuristic pattern to a demonstrative
pattern.” (Polya 1954, 42; emphasis added)
Fifthly, the premises of demonstrative inferences constitute a “complete
basis”, because “[i]f we receive some new information that does not
change our belief in the premises, it cannot change our belief in the
conclusion” (Polya 1948, 223). In contrast, the premises of plausible in-
ferences make up only a “partial basis”. This means that the complete
basis has a part which is not expressed through the premises and which
is, in this sense, “invisible”.28
25 Cf. Rescher –Brandom (1979, 160).
26 The most renowned Hungarian logician characterizes the nature of deductive logic
as follows:
“Logic in most cases cannot provide an exhaustive answer to the question
‘What conclusion can be drawn from it?,’ as a certain aggregate of
premises may support an infinite number of conclusions. What usually
lies behind the question just quoted is the problem of what should be
the next appropriate and desirable step during the relevant reasoning,
demonstration or argumentation. Logic sometimes presents a basis for
the answer, it delineates alternatives, but it cannot provide a universally
valid method. It can only give an answer to the question of whether
another proposition is a logical consequence of the given propositions
or not.” (Ruzsa 2000, 17; emphasis added)
27 See Tables 1 and 2 in section 3.5 for illustrations.
28 Let us illustrate this by a longer quotation, to which we will continuously refer
in the sequel:
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Accordingly, sixthly, the conclusions of plausible inferences are con-
text-dependent in a substantial and non-trivial way. The reason is that
the credibility of conclusions cannot be established “absolutely”, but de-
pends significantly on the “strength” or “weight” (Polya’s terms) of the
premises. How credible a conclusion is can be judged only relative to the
premises in particular and the properties of the partial basis in general
(Polya 1954, 115f; Rescher 1976, 111ff; Walton 2001, 164).
Seventhly, while demonstrative inferences are formal in that they tell
us that the conclusion is true if the premises are true, plausible inferences
also take the content of the premises into consideration.
3.3. On (P2b): plausible inferences and fallacies
After we have differentiated between demonstrative and plausible infer-
ences, the next question to be answered is how to distinguish between
plausible inferences and fallacies, because both are non-demonstrative
inferences. According to the classical view, a fallacious argument seems
to be deductively valid whereas it is not (see e.g., Hamblin 1970, 224; cf.
Woods–Walton 1989; Hansen–Pinto 1995). However, in the literature a
couple of problems have arisen which undermine the acceptability of the
classical view (see also van Eemeren–Grootendorst 2004, 158):
(i) In many cases the fallacy does not have a form which is similar to
a valid inference pattern. For example, fallacies of the type “argumentum
ad baculum” rely on the threatening of the opponent which is an ethical
fault rather than a logical one.
“[. . .] the premises constitute only one part of the basis on which the
conclusion rests, the fully expressed, the ‘visible’ part of the basis; there
is an unexpressed, invisible part, formed by something else, by inartic-
ulate feelings perhaps, or by unstated reasons. In fact, it can happen
that we receive some new information that leaves our belief in both
premises completely intact, but influences the trust we put in A
in a way just opposite to that expressed in the conclusion. To find A
more plausible on the ground of the premises of our heuristic syllogism
is only reasonable. Yet tomorrow I may find grounds, not interfering at
all with these premises that make A appear less plausible, or even de-
finitively refute it. The conclusion may be shaken and even overturned
completely by commotions in the invisible parts of its foundation, al-
though the premises, the visible part, stand quite firm.”
(Polya op.cit., 223f; emphasis added)
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(ii) In other cases the fallacy has a valid form. For example, the
inference of the form “A, therefore A” is trivially valid but commits the
fallacy of petitio principii.
(iii) There is a large group of fallacies which contain a premise the
acceptability of which can be questioned. For example, the fallacy “ar-
gumentum ad populum” relies on the argument that a statement is true
because most people agree with it.
(iv) The classical view is too restrictive, because it considers non-
demonstrative inferences as fallacies although both in scientific and every-
day argumentation different kinds of non-demonstrative inferences are
made use of.
Owing to these developments, the classical definition of “fallacy”
has to be given up. There is wide agreement about this in argumentation
theory; nevertheless, it is also clear that in connection with fallacies “most
new theories are still in an embryotic stage, so it is too early to make any
balanced judgements” (van Eemeren et al. 1996, 74). Therefore, we are in
no position to find a satisfactory definition in the literature. Nevertheless,
in the literature there are clear shifts of emphasis which we can use as
points of departure.
Firstly, one of the objections raised against the classical definition
of a fallacy is that “‘validity’ is incorrectly presented as an absolute and
conclusive criterion” (van Eemeren–Grootendorst 2004, 158). Correct-
ness has a much wider scope than deductive validity, because not only
deductive but other kinds of inferences may be correct in some sense as
well: “[. . .] fallacy is an inference that falls short of some standard of cor-
rect inference (deductive, inductive, or whatever)” (Walton 1997, 212;
emphasis added).
Secondly, in connection with this, what matters is not the valid vs.
invalid form of an inference, but rather, the way a certain inference has
been used in a given context of reasoning:
“If an argument is an instance of an invalid form of inference, it does not follow
that the argument must be invalid. Whether the argument is fallacious or
not depends on whether and how that form of inference has been used in
the context of a dialogue.” (Walton op.cit., 213; emphasis added)
Thirdly, this kind of context-dependency of fallacies seems to be par-
ticularly interesting with respect to the fact that, as we have seen in
the previous subsection, plausible inferences are context-dependent, too.
Therefore, at this point we may refine the question asked at the beginning
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of the present subsection: How can we distinguish between plausible in-
ferences and fallacies, if both are (a) non-demonstrative and (b) context
dependent?
The answer seems to follow immediately from our approach to plau-
sible inferences. As mentioned in the previous subsection, Polya con-
siders plausible inferences to be indispensable heuristic tools of gaining
new knowledge about the world. For Polya, the heuristic potential of
inferences necessarily means their effectivity, or, to use an alternative
expression in the same sense, constructivity: that is, their capability of
bringing us nearer to the solution of a given problem in a given informa-
tional state. This boils down to the claim that the context-dependency of
plausible inferences amounts to their effective use for the solution of the
problems raised on the basis of the information available. Consequently,
a fallacy arises if the use of a given pattern of inference is ineffective with
respect to the heuristic tasks it is expected to fulfil. Thus, the answer
to the question of how to draw the dividing line between plausible infer-
ences and fallacies is that what primarily matters is effectivity: whereas
plausible inferences are effective tools of acquiring new information in a
certain context of argumentation, fallacies are ineffective and sometimes
even destructive. This distinction is not specific to the framework we
have outlined by relying on Polya’s and Rescher’s classical views. For
example, van Eemeren and Grootendorst put forward a similar stand-
point, although the argumentation theoretical framework they developed
differs from ours:
“[. . .] fallacies are not ‘absolute’ mistakes that can simply be attributed to
discussants by an analyst who penetrates the ‘essence’ of reasonableness,
but moves in an argumentative discourse or text that can be characterized
as less than constructive, or even destructive [. . .].”
(van Eemeren –Grootendorst 2004, 175; emphasis added)
To avoid misunderstandings and unmotivated generalizations, at this
point three remarks have to be made. The first is that effectivity in
the sense just mentioned is not an absolute property of inferences. Even
if in one context of reasoning an inference seems to be effective—be-
cause it appears to further the solution of some problem—in the light of
new information, with respect to the new context thus modified it may
turn out to be ineffective. Secondly, it is important to emphasize once
more that the distinction we have just drawn reveals a shaded and subtle
characterization of fallacies, but it does not provide us with a universal
and in all situations clearly applicable criterion for judging whether a
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certain inference is fallacious or plausible. For example, an inference may
have multiple effects: while it solves a particular problem, it may give
rise to another one which perhaps cannot be solved on the basis of the
information given. Or, it may generate a contradiction between such a
solution and previously accepted theses of the theory which may either
undermine the theory or, in contrast, further its development. Moreover,
the evaluation of such reasoning itself is rooted in a partial basis, too.
Accordingly, the evaluation of scientific reasoning itself is a process of
plausible (meta)reasoning, which does not lead to final results, either.
Rather, all this provides us only with fallible, uncertain findings which
may seem plausible at a certain point of reasoning but can be rejected or
revised in the light of later considerations.29 Thirdly, it is important to
emphasize that although our approach shares many features with other
approaches to argumentation theory, there are significant differences be-
tween our standpoint and that of other authors.30
29 The notion of “context” within our approach to plausible reasoning will be ex-
plained in the next section.
30 Without an attempt to present a detailed discussion of the literature, we only
wish to indicate briefly in what aspects our approach is different from other stand-
points.
For example, although in the present paper we have cited Walton approv-
ingly several times and used quotations from his works to support our claims,
there are also clear differences between our approach and his. To illustrate this,
let us mention that Walton seems to agree with the “received view” of the analyt-
ical philosophy of science in so far as he accepts the substantial difference between
“the context of discovery” and “the context of justification”. This distinction is
reflected in his view of the argumentation structure of these two phases of inquiry.
He assumes that in “the context of discovery” the use of non-demonstrative in-
ferences is permitted, whereas—because of their uncertainty—in the “context
of justification” they must not be applied and only deductive and inductive in-
ferences are justified (Walton 1992a, 207f; 2001, 157ff, 164f). Cf. Rákosi (2005)
on this.
Or, to mention another example, we highly appreciate van Eemeren and
Grootendorst’s seminal contribution to argumentation theory and often agree
with their conclusions. However, we do not share their idea that the analysis
of fallacies should be based on normative models of argumentation which are
nothing else but “well-defined systems of rules for the resolution of differences
of opinion that the discussants intersubjectively accept” (cf. e.g., van Eemeren –
Grootendorst 2004, 175).
From Polya’s work our approach differs mainly in that we extend his basic
ideas to the handling of inconsistency (Kertész –Rákosi 2005b) and fallacies. The
main difference between Rescher’s and our approach is that while Rescher focuses
on plausibility metrics, our approach centres on patterns of plausible inference.
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What we have just said applies to (1) and (2) as well. They are non-
demonstrative inferences which may be fallacious in one context, but
correct in another: “Inference from a property of the part to a property
of the whole is warranted only in some cases.” (Walton 1997, 213)31
3.4. On the epistemological framework of plausible reasoning
The way plausible inferences work cannot be understood without outlin-
ing the overall epistemological framework which interprets the technique
we sketched in sections 3.1 and 3.2.
Let us remember that plausible inferences are rooted in a partial
basis. Starting from such a partial basis, we apply certain methods so
as to arrive at new pieces of information, while we cannot make sure
that the latter will really result in claims consistent with our initial as-
sumptions. In such cases we reason cyclically. That is, we start off from
a partial basis; then we return to the problems in question again and
again, and supplementing the partial basis with different latent back-
ground assumptions we transform the set of information at our disposal
by drawing additional plausible inferences, and re-evaluate the credibility
of the respective hypotheses. During these cyclic returns we aim to fil-
ter out hypotheses unacceptable for some reason gradually, according to
different—possibly contradictory—considerations (Rescher 1976, 111f,
118; Rescher 1987, 304). In this way it becomes possible to compare
one’s cycles and to assess one’s progress.
From this starting point four very important consequences follow.
The first is that, according both to Rescher and Polya, scientific inquiry
proceeds not only cyclically, but also prismatically. This means that
inasmuch as one tries to approach the given problem from several points
of view during the cycles of reassessing what is known (Rescher 1987,
306f, 313; Polya 1981, 68), the cycles continuously change the point of
view from which the information at our disposal is evaluated.
Secondly, due to its prismatic nature, the cyclic process of continuous
retrospective revalidation does not yield vicious circularity, because cyclic
reasoning never returns to the same stage.32
31 Of course, the same applies to inferences from properties of the whole to properties
of the part.
32 “The sort of ‘self-criticism’ at issue does not reflect any vicious or vitiating circu-
larity, but in effect amounts simply to a feedback process that uses later, more
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The third consequence is that the cyclic and prismatic procedure of
scientific inquiry can be best understood if we imagine it as a kind of
double helix in the sense of Figure 2.33
control of internal 
coherence 
retrospective revalidation (retrovalidation) 
THEORETICAL CYCLE  
PARTIAL 
BASIS 
 REASONING 
PROCESS 
  PUTATIVE 
RESULTS 
…
…
 … 
…
  … 
…
      
APPLICATIVE CYCLE 
retrospective revalidation (retrovalidation) control of 
external 
coherence 
Fig. 2
Starting from the information in the partial basis one obtains new in-
formation by drawing plausible inferences. These results are, however,
only putative, that is, their credibility has increased during the reasoning
process, but they are still only plausible and not certain. Since consis-
tency has to be established, it is unavoidable to control at least two things.
First, whether the putative results are consistent with all the other claims
in the partial basis of the theory (control of internal coherence). Second,
it has to be checked, too, if the putative results are consistent with the
“empirical” (whatever this term means) data (control of external coher-
ence). If one or both of the two questions are answered negatively, it has
to be decided—by the use of plausible inferences again—which parts of
the basis have to be given up or modified and which further background
assumptions should be added.
The aim of this cyclic and prismatic process of retrospective revali-
dation is primarily to rule out inconsistency and to arrive at a consistent
set of assumptions. In this sense, the model we have just sketched, does
not deny the basic values of rationality advocated by the “received view”
refined stages of the analysis to effect revisionary sophistications in the materials
from which earlier stages proceeded. One indeed returns to ‘the same point’ but
does so at a different cognitive level.” (Rescher 1976, 119; emphasis as in the
original and added)
33 Figure 2 is based on suggestions in Rescher (1977, 122) and Rescher (1979, 103),
but the terminology has been adapted to the notions we introduced in section 3.2.
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of the analytical philosophy of science; however, it considers them to be
ideals which one should strive for but which normally cannot be realized.
Thus, the fourth very important consequence of our approach to plau-
sible reasoning is that scientific rationality must not be reduced to the
use of demonstrative inferences; rather, it should be extended to capture
plausible inferences as well.34 It does not follow from the fact that the
conclusion of plausible inferences is not certainly true—but only credible,
fallible, context-dependent—that plausible inferences are not rational.
This highly important aspect of our model is, of course, in sharp con-
trast with the “received view” which restricts “rationality” to deductive
inferences (and probabilistically based inductive inferences, at best).35
34 “But in going beyond the purely formal considerations of logic [. . .] plausibility
theory does not go beyond the limits of rationality. [. . .] it aims at rational
alignment and coordination of inferences.” (Rescher 1976, 5; emphasis added)
35 This attitude is expressively characterized by Walton:
“[. . .] it is very hard to get modern readers to come to accept plausible
inference as having any hold on rational assent at all. We are so ac-
customed to the basing of our notion of rationality on knowledge and
belief, we tend to automatically dismiss plausibility as ‘subjective’, and
therefore of no worth as evidence of the kind required to rationally sup-
port a conclusion. The modern conventional wisdom is used to thinking
of rationality as change of belief or knowledge guided by deductive rea-
soning and inductive probability. This modern way of thinking finds
the notion of plausibility alien or even unintelligible, as an aspect of
thinking.” (Walton 2001, 151)
Such an anachronistic attitude is one of the typical, unreflecting and outmoded
methodological background assumptions underlying most linguistic theories, as
already mentioned in section 1. In fact, most mainstream linguistic theories
presuppose the concept of rationality associated with the “received view”, while
in doing linguistics they make substantial use of plausible reasoning. That is, in
so far as they declare to accept the standards of the “received view”, they have
to be evaluated as irrational by their own standards. Consequently, this seems
to be a contradiction which they cannot resolve by their own means within their
own framework. Therefore, in this respect, such theories—and, among them, all
the stages of generative linguistics and the two-level approach—are essentially
paraconsistent.
Nevertheless, the situation is, of course, much more complicated than the
above quotation and our comment suggest. For example, the fact that plausible
inferences may be considered to be rational, does not exclude the assumption that
they correspond to different standards of rationality than deductive and inductive
reasoning in scientific theories. Examining this problem would require a detailed
comparison of Walton’s, Rescher’s and our view which would be beyond the limits
of the present paper.
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Finally, let us—without defining it—explain in what sense in our
framework the notion of “context” will be used. In accordance with
Rescher and Polya, by “context” we will mean the whole of the infor-
mation which is at one’s disposal in a certain moment. In other words,
the context includes all the hypotheses which seem to be plausible at a
given stage of reasoning. This means that not only empirical hypotheses,
but also background assumptions of other sorts such as methodological
norms, patterns of inferences etc. are included in the context as well. Ac-
cordingly, in scientific theories the context changes continuously, because
in the course of the cycles of reasoning one may obtain new information
by the use of the method applied, or one may also give up some of the
hypotheses accepted in one of the previous cycles, or one may assume
new hypotheses, or the method can be changed, etc. For example, in
Figure 2 the “context” of a certain assumption in the partial basis at a
certain moment is the rest of the partial basis. Or, the context of the
“putative results” includes the partial basis and the methods applied in
this cycle—thus, in our case, the inferences (1) and (2). However, as
soon as a cycle is closed, the context is supplemented by all the results
provided by the whole cycle at issue. Because these results may contra-
dict certain elements of the partial basis, it may be the case that one
has to revaluate the hypotheses accepted previously. Accordingly, in this
way the context may change again.
3.5. Summary
In section 3 we sketched an approach to plausible reasoning by distin-
guishing between three kinds of inferences: demonstrative, plausible and
fallacious ones. This means that we argued for giving up the dichotomy
“fallacy vs. demonstrative inference”. See Figure 3 for this dichotomy.
valid inferences   invalid inferences 
demonstrative inferences non-demonstrative inferences:  
  −  plausible inferences  
  −  fallacies
Fig. 3
Rather, we suggested treating both demonstrative and plausible infer-
ences as correct ones and assuming that non-demonstrative inferences
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consist of at least two subgroups, namely, fallacies and plausible infer-
ences as illustrated in Figure 4.
correct inferences     incorrect inferences 
 
    demonstrative  plausible     fallacies 
    inferences   inferences       
     non-demonstrative inferences
Fig. 4
Consequently, we may summarize our next auxiliary hypothesis as follows
which is an answer to the question (P2):
(a)(H2) The distinction between demonstrative and non-demonstrative inferences
rests on the certainty vs. uncertainty of the conclusion.
(b) Within non-demonstrative inferences, the distinction between plausible and
fallacious inferences depends on the particular context of reasoning. The
criterion is the effectivity of the inference within the context given.
However, the distinctions we have made do not mean that there is no
link between these kinds of inferences:
(i) As we have shown in section 3.2, patterns of plausible reasoning
can be seen as tending to the corresponding patterns of demonstrative
inference when the credibility of the premises tends to certainty. As far
as the premises of plausible inferences approach certainty, so, too, does
their conclusion.
(ii) An analogous relation holds between plausible inferences and
fallacies: the latter are nothing but plausible inferences deemed ineffective
in a certain context of argumentation. If we give up the static view of
fallacies that focuses on the form of inferences only, and try to consider
the content of arguments by interpreting them dynamically, then fallacies
are seen in a new light. They appear to be extreme cases on a scale: they
are obtained from plausible inferences in that one moves towards contexts
of argumentation in which these structures work less and less effectively.
In sum, we assume that reasoning centres on plausible inferences from
which one can move towards two extremes: demonstrative and fallacious
ones (Figure 5). From another point of view this means that, since the
form of an inference itself does not decide whether it is plausible, demon-
strative or fallacious, the dividing lines between these categories are not
fixed either, but they are in constant motion depending on the particular
context of reasoning.
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demonstrative    plausible inferences    fallacies 
inferences   
Fig. 5
Let us illuminate this system of inferences by two further remarks. Firstly,
for example, modus tollens or modus ponens are demonstrative, if the
premises are certain and, consequently, the conclusion is certain, too. We
obtain, however, different cases of what Polya (1954, 23ff) calls shaded
modus tollens or shaded modus ponens as soon as—while the form
of the inference is the same—the premises and via the premises the con-
clusion, too, are not certain, but only credible to a particular degree.
Furthermore, if for example a premise is held to be true although it is
not because it overgeneralizes (i.e., when its plausibility is misjudged),36
then the conclusion will be faulty and the inference has to be evaluated
as a fallacy. That is, the transition between these categories is clearly
context-dependent, while plausible inferences can approach two extremes
continuously. See Tables 1 and 2 (overleaf) as illustrations of the tran-
sition between the categories mentioned.37
Secondly, it is worth emphasizing that our model fits smoothly into
current tendencies of inference research. For example, in summarizing the
main findings of modern approaches to fallacies, Kienpointner emphasizes
the following as one of the key points:
“Der Übergang von plausibler zur trugschlüssigen Argumentation ist graduel-
ler Natur, wobei für die entsprechende Einstufung von Argumentation stets
der [. . .] Kontext zu berücksichtigen ist. [. . .] Die Ermittlung von Trugschlüs-
sen ist nur im Rahmen einer umfassenden Theorie der ‘fallacies’ möglich, die
festlegt, was als ‘fallacy’ zählt und was nicht.” (Kienpointner 1992, 249–50)
Since many further aspects of Kienpointner’s approach to plausible in-
ferences differ substantially from Polya’s, Rescher’s and ours, the above
statement serves as an independent argument for our model of fallacy.
36 In section 4.4 we will discuss such a case.
37 We have to remark three things. First, the second premise of each inference in
the tables involves a comparison between the credibility of a piece of information
(A resp. B) in a given moment and its credibility at a former informational state.
Second, it is important to emphasize that there are many versions of each plausible
inference pattern, because not only the second premise can be uncertain but the
first one or both premises as well. Third, there are of course many different stages
in the continuum and therefore, many different degrees of credibility/uncertainty.
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Table 1
demonstrative shaded plausible plausible fallacy
Premises: Premises: Premises: Premises: Premises:
It is certain It is certain It is certain It is certain It is certain
that if A, that if A, that if A, that if A, that if A,
then B then B then B then B then B
B is certainly B has become B has become B has turned out B is certainly
false less credible more credible to be true true
Conclusion: Conclusion: Conclusion: Conclusion: Conclusion:
A is certainly A has become A has become some- A has become A is certainly
false less credible what more credible more credible true
modus shaded shaded reduction affirming the
tollens38 modus tollens reduction consequent
Table 2
demonstrative shaded plausible plausible fallacy
Premises: Premises: Premises: Premises: Premises:
It is certain It is certain It is certain It is certain It is certain
that if A, that if A, that if A, that if A, that if A,
then B then B then B then B then B
A is certainly A has become A has become A has turned out A is certainly
true more credible less credible to be false false
Conclusion: Conclusion: Conclusion: Conclusion: Conclusion:
B is certainly B has become B has become some- B has become B is certainly
true more credible what less credible less credible false
modus shaded shaded refuting refuting the denying the
ponens modus ponens the antecedent antecedent antecedent39
38 One might ask why the premises and the conclusion claim the certainty of the
propositions at issue. Firstly, the formal structure of modus tollens is of course
{A ⊃ B; ∼B} ⇒ ∼A. However, it is not sufficient to require formal validity
only, because the inference has to be sound, too: “When an argument is valid,
and all of its premises are true, we call it sound. The conclusion of a sound argu-
ment obviously must be true” (Copi–Burgess-Jackson 1996, 56). This means that
(formal) validity alone is not enough to establish the truth of the conclusion—
therefore, soundness, in other words, the certainty of the premises is required.
Secondly, we must not forget that we are discussing inferences not (to quote
Quine) “from a logical point of view,” but rather, from an argumentation the-
oretical point of view. That is, what we are focussing on is not pure logic, but
reasoning which involves, among others, the way logic is used. The use of logic
also means that it is not only the form of inferences that matters, but their con-
tent, too, even in the case of valid inferences. Therefore, from an argumentation
theoretical point of view, the interpretation of modus tollens suggested in the
first column of the table is, of course, fully justified.
39 The pattern of refuting the antecedent is dynamic (in the sense of Polya, see
section 3.2), whereas that of denying the antecedent is not. The reason is that in
the case of fallacies the second premise is not dynamic, because according to the
traditional view inferences are static.
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4. On the effectivity of (1) and (2)
4.1. The problem
After we have clarified the difference between fallacies and plausible in-
ferences, the question arises whether (1) and (2) are made a fallacious or
a plausible use of in the three theories we are examining. By definition,
this question should be reduced to the problem as to the effectivity of
(1) and (2) in the given theoretical contexts.
However, examining whole theories is a very complicated and lengthy
matter, therefore the problem should be further specified. How can we
test whether the use of (1) and (2) is effective or not? One—but cer-
tainly not the only—way is to argue as follows. Firstly, we will choose
a well-known paradigm example of fallacies. Let this example be petitio
principii, because it is known as a typically ineffective strategy which
does not yield new insights and does not contribute to the solution of the
problems raised. It is especially interesting that in the literature all three
theories have been accused of committing the fallacy of petitio principii.
Secondly, we will try to show that by the use of (1) and (2) this fallacy,
which would occur otherwise, can be avoided. If we succeed in showing
this, then we may conclude, thirdly, that (1) and (2) have been used
effectively, because with their help an ineffective strategy of reasoning
could be avoided and therefore the heuristic capacity of the theory has
been restored. Accordingly, our next question is:
(P3) Can by the use of (1) and (2) in the context of the three theories the fallacy of
petitio principii be avoided?40
If it can, then the theories we are examining may be—at least with
respect to the use of (1) and (2), provisionally and partially—legitimized
as scientific enterprises. If not, then one must conclude that they are
false theories built on fallacious reasoning.
40 By petitio principii we mean in accordance with our characterization of fallacies
ineffective or even destructive circularity which does not result in any new knowl-
edge and serves only as self-legitimization.
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4.2. Generative linguistics
As regards generative linguistics, according to one of Chomsky’s initial
hypotheses, language is governed by rules. However, since this hypothesis
cannot be tested by direct empirical evidence, the risk of circularity is
relatively great:
“Imagine a debate between radical regularists, like Chomsky, and moderate
ones who are convinced that there is no regularity in language over and
above the obvious cases of agreement, comparison of adjectives, etc. The
opposing parties would soon be involved in vicious circles. [. . .] In fact, the
very acceptability of the data relevant to the question seems to depend on a
prior decision concerning the degree of systematicity of language. Hence the
assumption of regularity cannot be regarded as a generalization from hard
facts. I would like to suggest that it may be understood, partly, in terms of
Chomsky’s views on human nature. He thinks that creativity presupposes
rules. So if language use is creative, it has to take place within a system of
rules. Thus it might be the rules governing our creative activities where the
principle of regularity comes from.” (Forrai 1987, 51; emphasis added)
This kind of circularity can be avoided by the use of (2). In particular,
as we have shown in section 2.2, the principle which says that linguistic
competence is governed by rules was inferred from the properties of hu-
man nature via (2). Therefore, the reasoning does not return to the same
state, but to a qualitatively different informational state. Consequently,
the reasoning is not viciously circular; rather, it is cyclic and rests on the
retrospective revalidation of the partial basis.
Nevertheless, in other contexts the circularity arises again from dif-
ferent “prismatic” points of view. For example, it is instructive to observe
that in certain contexts of argumentation Chomsky reverses the inferen-
tial relationship between human nature and linguistic competence. It is
not only the case that he infers properties of the latter from properties
of the former, but also vice versa:
“Given the role of language in human life and probably human evolution, and
given its intimate relations to what I have been calling ‘common-sense un-
derstanding’, it would not be very surprising to discover that other systems
within cognitive capacity have something of the character of the language
faculty and its products. We should anticipate that these other cognitive
systems too set limits on human intellectual achievement, by virtue of the
very structure that makes it possible to acquire rich and comprehensive sys-
tems of belief and knowledge, insight and understanding. I have already
discussed this matter briefly in connection with the ‘science-forming capac-
ity’ (whatever it may be).” (Chomsky 1976, 123)
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Moreover, on the same page he also claims that even visual perception
could have been chosen as a point of departure:
“I would like to stress again that these conjectures should not seem in any
way surprising to the natural scientist. Rather, they conform reasonably
well to what is known about how the brain works in other domains, say, the
construction of visual space and the objects in it. Furthermore, as a number
of biologists have pointed out, something of the sort is to be expected on
simple evolutionary grounds.” (Chomsky op.cit., 123f)
At a later point in the same work he reverses the direction of argumen-
tation again:
“If the approach to the study of cognitive capacity outlined earlier is a proper
one, then we can hope to develop a theory of human nature in its psycho-
logical aspects. [. . .] No one would seriously argue today, for example, that
our construction of perceptual space is guided by empiricist maxims. The
same, I think, is true of the language faculty, which relates more closely to
the essential nature of the human species.” (ibid., 125f)
Then he handles the study of linguistic competence and human cognition
simultaneously:
“Imagine a scientist, henceforth S, who is unencumbered by the ideological
baggage that forms part of our intellectual tradition [. . .]. S might begin with
the observation that people seem to act in systematic ways with respect to
the objects around them and that they use and respond to expressions in
organized ways. He might also conclude that humans, rather early in their
lives, seem to arrive at steady states of development in these respects, states
which provide a basis for human actions and responses. [. . .] S might now
proceed to characterize these steady states, attributing to the organism two
cognitive structures: (i) a system of beliefs and expectations about the na-
ture and behavior of objects, and (ii) a system of language. Suppose he calls
the first system ‘common sense’ and the second ‘grammar’.” (ibid., 139)
Although these quotations suggest that Chomsky’s argumentation still
appears to be circular, the point is that the premises and the conclusions
of the inferences of types (1) and (2) correspond to different informational
stages and are thus “at a different cognitive level” (Rescher 1976, 119).
The credibility of Chomsky’s argumentation is significantly enhanced by
the fact that inferences from the whole to the part and from the part
to the whole are not restricted to single properties, but rather, affect a
coherent network of properties. Accordingly, besides certain single prop-
erties, linguistic competence, human nature and society are related by
structural similarities— that is by relations between corresponding ele-
ments—as well. Consequently, whole-part and part-whole inferences are
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closely connected to a system of analogical inferences (see also the first
quotation from Forrai in section 2.2). In a nutshell, linguistic competence,
human nature and society are governed by regularities; these regularities
presuppose the creative behaviour of people; creativity, however, can be
manifested in behaviour characterized by regularities; the regularities are
not arbitrary, but can operate only within man’s biological constraints;
it is, however, these constraints that enable human beings to act freely
and creatively. See Figure 6 as the extension of Figure 1 with respect
to these relations.
society 
man 
linguistic competence 
     regularity 
  creativity  
    
rules  
constraints 
freedom 
Fig. 6
These structural relationships facilitate the application of Chomsky’s
model of linguistic competence to other areas of cognition, and in doing
so, he tests his hypotheses on the basis of continuously modified amounts
of information. As long as his approach can be applied to other fields of
human cognitive behaviour as well, all these assumptions clearly enhance
each other’s credibility. This means that as a result of drawing inferences
along the lines of (1) and (2), a strong analogy between man, linguistic
competence and society is established.41
41 As Gentner and Markman emphasize, it is this systematicity that is responsible
for the effectivity of analogical reasoning:
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Consequently, our considerations seem to support the assumption
that Chomsky’s reasoning is cyclic and prismatic (see section 3.4) rather
than circular (Figure 7).
Fig. 7
This cycle can be supplemented by further pieces of information, for ex-
ample, the basic assumptions of a certain version of generative grammar:
control of internal 
coherence 
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(1) and (2); 
analogical 
inferences 
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retrospective revalidation (retrovalidation) 
control of external 
coherence 
Fig. 8
“The defining characteristic of analogy is that it involves an alignment of
relational structure. [. . .] Analogies tend to match connected systems
of relations [. . .]. A matching set of relations interconnected by higher
order constraining relations makes a better analogical match than an
equal number of matching relations that are unconnected to each other.
The systematicity principle captures a tacit preference for coherence
and causal predictive power in analogical processing.”
(Gentner –Markman 1997, 47)
Thus, the relationship between whole-part and part-whole inferences on the one
hand and such a systematic use of analogies on the other hand, clearly increases
the effectivity of the former.
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Thus, (1) and (2) play an important heuristic role, because the basic
background assumptions of the theory are obtained with their help.
So as to evaluate these findings, it is worth remarking that, how-
ever different the particular versions of Chomsky’s generative grammar
are, they remain within the boundaries of the inferences reconstructed in
(3)–(9). For example, both the Standard Theory and GB Theory make
substantial use of (3), irrespective of the fact that the content of the par-
ticular inferences is different. This means that although these versions
focus on partly differing ideas—for example the Standard Theory focuses
on rules, while GB theory centres on freedom within constraints and in
the case of minimalism it is constraints that are emphasized—, in this
respect, too, (1) and (2) play an indispensable role in Chomsky’s theory.
The reason they do so is that the frequent use of inferences which are
manifestations of the patterns (1) and (2) belong to the philosophical ba-
sis of Chomsky’s work. One might object that this philosophical basis is
not constitutive of Chomsky’s linguistic theory that focuses on the tech-
nical innovations widely applied by linguists. However, this objection is
clearly unmotivated. Unfortunately, we cannot go into a detailed proof of
the latter claim, therefore, let us substitute such a proof by the following
quotation which nicely summarizes the main issue:
“[. . .] many linguists (including many practicing generative linguists) seem
not to take much interest in Noam Chomsky’s general (‘philosophical’) writ-
ings on the nature of language. [. . .] Among such linguists, there appears
to be a sense that Chomsky’s more general thinking about the nature of
human language (as opposed to his more specific work, for example, within
the current Chomskyan model known as the Minimalist programme) rep-
resents merely ‘the philosophical side of (Chomskyan) linguistics’, an area
that is viewed by many linguists as being, in some sense, an optional extra,
distinct from, and not having any obvious direct bearing on, the business
of getting on with doing linguistic analyses (‘linguistics proper’ as opposed
to philosophy). This outlook is unfortunate, since foundational ideas are
surely what any significant linguistic theory is derived from. It is certainly
the more general issues which drive Chomsky’s thinking, and from which the
Minimalist programme and all its predecessors are derived.”
(Carr 2003, 615; emphasis added)
Thus our argument is simple: if the use of (1) and (2) is effective for the
philosophical foundations of Chomsky’s theory and these foundations are
effective for all the versions of this theory, then (1) an (2) are effective
not only for Chomsky’s philosophy, but also for his “linguistics proper”.
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4.3. The two-level approach
According to Müller (1991) the fallacy of petitio principii characterizes
modular approaches to cognition generally:
“Ein logischer Fehlschluß, der sich immer wieder in modularistischen Theorien
der Kognitiven Wissenschaften finden läßt, ist die Interpretation forschungs-
strategisch motivierter Abgrenzungen als realistische Aussagen über die Or-
ganisation von Geist und Gehirn. Daß wir die Welt oder unseren eigenen
Geist vielleicht nur durch einen modularistischen ‘Theoriefilter’ erkennen
können, bedeutet nicht, daß Welt und Geist modular sind.”
(Müller op.cit., 407; emphasis added)
This applies to the two-level approach, too—all the more so, because its
main empirical hypothesis says that “all human cognitive behaviour is
organized in a modular fashion”.
In the two-level approach very much depends on the assumption that
there is a set of modules. However, proving the existence of relatively au-
tonomous systems and subsystems is one of the most difficult tasks of
modularism, because there is a substantial lack of empirical evidence
(whatever “empirical evidence” may mean). Therefore, the two-level ap-
proach runs the risk of circularity as well. In particular, its proponents ac-
cept the empirical hypothesis that knowledge of language is based on the
interaction of relatively autonomous systems, because, for methodologi-
cal reasons, the object of investigation can be grasped only by systematic
simplifications, namely, its subdivision into separate (sub)systems. At the
same time, however, they accept the methodological principle that the
object of investigation has to be subdivided into relatively autonomous
systems, because they have accepted the empirical hypothesis, according
to which knowledge of language consists of subsystems.42 This circular
reasoning seems to be clearly formulated for example in the following
passage from one of the seminal works by Bierwisch and Lang:
“Singling out autonomous subsystems of mental organization and specify-
ing their content is based on the assumption that the structure and the
functioning of cognitive systems do indeed have such a modular structure.
Autonomous subsystems and structural levels of the theory, from this factual
point of view, correspond to autonomous subsystems in the actual structure
of mental states and processes. This actual structure, however, cannot be
discovered directly but only in the form of explanatory theories. From this
42 See Müller (ibid.) and Kertész (2004a) for a detailed discussion of the modularistic
circle.
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theoretical point of view, identifying subsystems and explaining their au-
tonomy, as well as finding out the nature of their interaction, becomes an
aspect of adequate theory formation. Autonomous components of the theory
are then justified (a) by the independence of the basic concepts, (b) by the
internal structure of the theoretical components which the basic concepts
enter and (c) by the possibility of formulating regularities in the frame-
work of (a) and (b) which explain the facts on the appropriate level of
abstraction.” (Bierwisch – Lang 1989, 495; emphasis added)
However, research within the two-level approach can be seen as a series
of cyclically proceeding plausible inferences, rather than being circular.
Namely in section 2.3 we have shown that the two-level approach uses
(1) and (2) as constitutive tools of theory-formation. Therefore, if one
interprets the last quotation on the basis of the framework we introduced
in section 3, then it follows immediately that (1) and (2) contribute to
the resolution of the circularity and to the generation of a cyclic and
prismatic reasoning mechanism. Figure 9 is intended to illustrate the
cyclicity of reasoning within the two-level approach.
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Although at every point of the argumentation proponents of the two-level
approach try to identify the major premises and to argue clearly on their
basis, evidently we must not exclude the possibility that there is indeed an
“invisible part” of the basis (see section 3.2). This invisible part involves
those assumptions of the two-level approach which one does not make use
of in the argumentation explicitly and whose indirect consequences one
cannot realize—for example the “empirical evidence” (in whatever sense)
supporting the autonomy of what the two-level approach calls “semantic
form”. We may conclude that it is the particular argumentative context
within the two-level approach that decides whether the applications of (1)
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and (2) are plausible or fallacious, because (a) the modules whose exis-
tence the argumentation hinges on are heuristically motivated theoretical
constructs, and (b) apart from the “visible basis” of the argumentation
there is an “invisible basis” (in the sense of Polya 1948, 223f, quoted in
section 3.2), whose implications may be different from those of the visible
one—for instance, if the “empirical evidence” turned out to refute the
autonomy of semantic form and that of the conceptual module.
Therefore, the use of (1) is, due to the cyclic nature of the argument,
clearly effective. That is, the application of (1) is to be interpreted as
plausible rather than fallacious. This situation can be retained as long
as the starting hypotheses—that is, the partial basis—are considered
to be plausible. However, as soon as serious arguments arise against the
modularity of the knowledge of language to which the theory cannot react
convincingly, the plausibility of (1) has to be subjected to revision.
Moreover, as Figure 10 suggests, in later cycles the two level approach
uses the assumption of modularity as a premise and thus applies (2), too
(see also section 3.3).
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4.4. The cognitive theory of metaphor
Critics of Lakoff and Johnson’s approach have recently argued that the
authors commit the fallacy of petitio principii. For example, Haser (2005,
145ff) enumerates and analyzes such cases in great detail; see also Mur-
phy (1996, 183). To mention another source, McGlone accuses Lakoff
and Johnson of the following fundamental error which he thinks clearly
undermines their whole approach:
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“[. . .] Lakoff’s claim that metaphors transcend their linguistic manifestations
to influence conceptual structure rests solely on these manifestations. How
do we know that people think of theories in terms of buildings? Because
people often talk about theories using building-related expressions. Why do
people often talk about theories using building-related expressions? Because
people think about theories in terms of buildings. Clearly, the conceptual
metaphor view must go beyond circular reasoning of this sort and seek evi-
dence that is independent of the linguistic evidence.”
(McGlone 2001, 95; emphasis added)
That is, Lakoff and Johnson infer the existence of metaphorical con-
cepts from the use of metaphorical expressions, and they infer the use
of metaphorical expressions from the existence of metaphorical concepts.
It is important to emphasize right at the outset that Lakoff and John-
son’s reasoning is much more difficult to reconstruct than Chomsky’s and
Bierwisch and Lang’s. Namely, the former argue simultaneously into two
opposing directions (cf. (25) and (39)), while they do not differentiate
between these two lines of argumentation systematically.43
Let us begin with the first direction. From a methodological point
of view, metaphorical expressions are primary, because the following is
assumed:44
(24) The cognitive theory of metaphor infers properties of metaphorical concepts from
properties of metaphorical expressions.
The problem of circularity is closely related to (24), because it concerns
the methodological question of how to account for the inferential con-
nection between linguistic expressions and concepts. Therefore, before
turning to the role (1) and (2) play in the resolution of circularity, we
have to discuss the chain of inferences which belong to the methodolog-
ical line of reasoning summarized in (24).45 As we will see, (27)–(31)
43 Therefore, the whole of their reasoning is present simultaneously at every stage
and it is hard to reconstruct it as a linear sequence of inferences. What the
conclusion and what the premise is depends basically on the particular point at
which one interrupts the reasoning and begins with the reconstruction.
44 “Since metaphorical expressions in our language are tied to metaphorical concepts
in a systematic way, we can use metaphorical linguistic expressions to study the
nature of metaphorical concepts and to gain an understanding of the metaphorical
structure of our activities.” (Lakoff – Johnson 1980, 7; emphasis added)
45 Please note that the inferences discussed in the present section are plausible and
not deductively valid. That is, their conclusion is only credible to a certain
extent and not true with certainty. For the precise structure of shaded modus
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below increase the plausibility of (24), and with the help of (1) and (2)
further conclusions can be drawn.
Lakoff and Johnson seem to accept the principle that “one can move
freely and gradually from facts about language to facts about human
cognition and further on to facts about human life generally [. . .]” (Harder
1999, 196). However, the structure of such a “move” is anything but clear:
“The trouble with Lakoff/Johnson’s position is this: All that Lakoff/Johnson’s
data show is that we employ certain expressions (rather than concepts) that
can—but need not—be associated with the domain of WAR. Demonstrating
the presence of metaphorical concepts is impossible on the basis of purely
linguistic evidence (cf. Murphy 1996). How is the jump from language
to thought justified? Lakoff/Johnson (1980: 5) do not tackle this question,
merely repeating their principal claim again.”
(Haser 2005, 147; italics as in the original, bold emphasis added)
Our model of plausible reasoning outlined in section 3 suggests the fol-
lowing reconstruction of the inference Harder and Haser refer to:
(25) Premises:
(a) Linguistic expressions associated with arguments are metaphorical.
(b) 〈Between linguistic expressions and concepts there is such a relationship
that from properties of linguistic expressions one may infer properties of
concepts.〉
Conclusion:
(c) The concept argument is metaphorically structured.
Our model explains Haser’s (2005, 147) criticism by interpreting (25b)
as an “invisible” premise (in the sense of Polya, see section 3.2) whose
particular content is not known.46 This is especially interesting, because,
as we know, plausible reasoning proceeds, among other things, in such
a way that the partial basis contains alternative assumptions between
which one can choose only by examining “the credibility”, “the weight”,
“the strength” of each of them in the light of the particular informational
state. In the present case, the alternatives one of which should specify
(25b) may be for example the following.
tollens and shaded modus ponens see Tables 1 and 2 in section 3.5. The reason
for reconstructing the following inferences in a simplified form—i.e., for omit-
ting the plausibility-indicators (“possible”, “less credible”, “more credible”, “cer-
tain”, etc.)—is that otherwise our analyses would be too complex and difficult
to capture for the reader.
46 Invisible premises are marked by “〈” and “〉”.
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(26) Alternative premises in the partial basis:
(a) Meanings and concepts are the same and “linguistic expression” is a short-
hand for “the meaning of a linguistic expression”.
(b) Meanings are part of the conceptual system and “linguistic expression” is
shorthand for “the meaning of a linguistic expression”.
(c) Meanings and concepts are analogous and “linguistic expression” is short-
hand for “the meaning of a linguistic expression”.
(d) Meanings and concepts are isomorphic and “linguistic expression” is short-
hand for “the meaning of a linguistic expression”.
(e) Linguistic expressions are indices of concepts.
(f) etc.
Nevertheless, one may argue that both Haser’s criticism and our recon-
struction of Lakoff and Johnson’s reasoning in (25) and (26) are incorrect,
because in the cognitive theory of metaphor the inferential connection be-
tween the metaphoricity of linguistic expressions and that of concepts is
defined clearly:
“If metaphors were merely linguistic expressions, we would expect different
linguistic expressions to be different metaphors. Thus, ‘We’ve hit a dead-end
street’ would constitute one metaphor. ‘We can’t turn back now’ would con-
stitute another, entirely different metaphor. ‘Their marriage is on the rocks’
would involve still a different metaphor. And so on for dozens of examples.
Yet we don’t seem to have dozens of different metaphors here. We have one
metaphor, in which love is conceptualized as a journey.” (Lakoff 1993, 209)
The structure of this argument is that of shaded modus tollens (cf. 3.5)
which is a typical pattern of plausible inference:
(27) Premises:
(a) If metaphors were merely linguistic expressions, then different linguistic ex-
pressions would be different metaphors.
(b) It is not the case that different linguistic expressions are different metaphors.
Conclusion:
(c) Metaphors are not merely linguistic expressions.
Furthermore, the idea of systematicity also plays an important role:
“The love is a journey metaphor and Reddy’s Conduit Metaphor were
the two examples that first convinced me that metaphor was not a figure
of speech, but a mode of thought, defined by a systematic mapping from a
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source to a target domain. What convinced me were the three characteristics
of metaphor that I have just discussed:
1. The systematicity in the linguistic correspondences.
2. The use of metaphor to govern reasoning and behavior based on that
reasoning.
3. The possibility for understanding novel extensions in terms of the con-
ventional correspondences.” (Lakoff 1993, 210; emphasis added)
This argumentation can be reconstructed the following way:47
(28) Premises:
(a) If metaphors in connection with love were merely linguistic expressions, then
there would be no systematicity among them.
(b) There is systematicity among linguistic expressions in connection with love.
Conclusion:
(c) Metaphors in connection with love are not merely linguistic expressions.
Lakoff (1993) uses (28c) as a premise supplemented by an analogy be-
tween metaphorical expressions associated with love:48
(29) Premises:
(a) If metaphors in connection with love are not merely linguistic expressions and
we systematically speak about love as if it were a journey when metaphorical
expressions associated with love are used, then there is a systematic mapping
from the conceptual domain journey to the conceptual domain love when
we speak about love.
(b) Metaphors in connection with love are not merely linguistic expressions and
we systematically speak about love as if it were a journey when metaphorical
expressions associated with love are used.
Conclusion:
(c) There is a systematic mapping from the conceptual domain journey to the
conceptual domain love when we speak about love.
Similarly to (29), Lakoff (ibid.) obtains (30) as well:49
47 The structure of this argument is that of shaded modus tollens, too.
48 The structure of this argument is that of shaded modus ponens.
49 The structure of this argument is that of shaded modus ponens, too.
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(30) Premises:
(a) If metaphors in connection with love are not merely linguistic expressions and
we systematically use patterns of inference about journeys to reason about
love when metaphorical expressions associated with love are used, then there
is a systematic mapping from one conceptual domain to the other when we
reason about love.
(b) Metaphors in connection with love are not merely linguistic expressions and
we systematically use patterns of inference about journeys to reason about
love when metaphorical expressions associated with love are used.
Conclusion:
(c) There is a systematic mapping from one conceptual domain to the other
when we reason about love.
The next link in the chain is an analogical inference which contains “in-
visible” premises as well:
(31) Premises:
(a) There is a systematic mapping from the conceptual domain journey to the
conceptual domain love when we speak about love.
(b) There is a systematic mapping from one conceptual domain to the other
when we reason about love.
(c) The connection between the two conceptual domains is in both cases always
metaphorical, i.e., a unidirectional mapping between the source domain and
the target domain.50
(d) 〈The conceptual domain love as well as the conceptual domain journey
are the same when we talk and when we reason about love.〉
(e) 〈There is no difference between the principles governing how we speak about
love and the principles governing how we reason about love.〉
Conclusion:
(f) There is only one set of principles governing speaking and reasoning about
love, i.e., the concept love is metaphorically structured.51
50 “[. . .] the metaphor can be understood as a mapping (in the mathematical sense)
from a source domain (in this case, journeys) to a target domain (in this case,
love).” (Lakoff op.cit., 206)
51 “As a linguist and a cognitive scientist, I ask two commonplace questions:
Is there a general principle governing how these linguistic expressions
about journeys are used to characterize love?
Is there a general principle governing how our patterns of inference
about journeys are used to reason about love when expressions such as
these are used?
The answer to both is yes. Indeed, there is a single general principle that answers
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Just as in the case of (25), here it is also the very information specifying
the connection between the metaphorical structure of linguistic expres-
sions and that of concepts that is missing from the “visible” part of the
partial basis.
After having explicated the inferential chain leading from metaphor-
ical expressions to metaphorical concepts, let us turn to the role (1) and
(2) play in Lakoff and Johnson’s reasoning. Chapters 1 and 2 of Lakoff–
Johnson (1980) witness that (1) and (2) undoubtedly assume a key po-
sition in the argumentative strategies the authors apply. For example
this means that, after having analyzed a number of linguistic expressions
and found that they are metaphorical, they conclude that language is
metaphorical (see Figure 11):
(32) Premises:
(a) The concept of love is part of the conceptual system underlying language.52
(b) The concept of love is metaphorically structured.53
Conclusion:
(c) The conceptual system underlying language is metaphorically structured.
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both questions. But it is a general principle that is neither part of the grammar
of English, nor the English lexicon. Rather, it is part of the conceptual system
underlying English: It is a principle for understanding the domain of love in terms
of the domain of journeys.” (Idem.; emphasis added)
52 Cf. “The conceptual system underlying a language contains thousands of concep-
tual metaphors—conventional mappings from one domain to another, such as
the Event Structure Metaphor.” (Ibid., 239; emphasis added)
53 Cf. (31a) and (c).
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In analogy to (32), from (30c) they obtain (33) via (1) (see Figure 12):
(33) Premises:
(a) The concept of love is part of the conceptual system underlying reasoning.
(b) The concept of love is metaphorically structured.54
Conclusion:
(c) The conceptual system underlying reasoning is metaphorically structured.
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Via (1) from (31d), (34) is obtained:
(34) Premises:
(a) The conceptual domain love as well as the conceptual domain journey are
the same when we talk and when we reason about love.
(b) The concepts love and journey are part of the conceptual system under-
lying language and of the conceptual system underlying reasoning.
Conclusion:
(c) Thinking and language rest on the same conceptual system, i.e., there is only
one conceptual system underlying language and reasoning.55
Similarly, (31e) can be extended to the whole of the conceptual system
as well (Figure 13):
54 Cf. (31b) and (c).
55 Cf. “[. . .] communication is based on the same conceptual system that we use in
thinking and acting.” (Lakoff – Johnson 1980, 4; emphasis added)
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(35) Premises:
(a) The concept of love is part of the conceptual system.
(b) The concept love is metaphorically structured.
Conclusion:
(c) The conceptual system is metaphorically structured.
(35c) is one of the central hypotheses of Lakoff and Johnson’s theory.56
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However, Lakoff and Johnson also postulate the inverse relationship be-
tween metaphorical expressions and metaphorical concepts. Whereas
metaphorical expressions are, as we have seen in (24), methodologically
primary with respect to metaphorical concepts, from an ontological point
of view they are secondary, because the following is assumed:
(36) Metaphorical expressions are the linguistic manifestations of metaphorical con-
cepts.57
56 “[. . .] the human conceptual system is metaphorically structured [. . .].” (Ibid., 6)
57 “Metaphors as linguistic expressions are possible precisely because there are
metaphors in a person’s conceptual system.” (Idem.)
“Metaphor is fundamentally conceptual, not linguistic, in nature. Metaphorical
language is a surface manifestation of conceptual metaphor.” (Lakoff 1993, 244)
For example, the conceptual metaphor love is a journey is manifested in the
metaphorical expressions this relationship is foundering, we are going nowhere,
this relationship is a dead-end street, we are at a crossroads, etc.
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Accordingly, the authors also argue in the opposite direction than (24)
suggests, because they explain certain characteristics of metaphorical ex-
pressions on the basis of characteristics of metaphorical concepts. There-
fore, for each inference of the methodological cycles there can be an in-
verse inference in one of the ontological cycles. For example, by the use
of (2), the following inferences are carried out:
(37) Premises:
(a) Abstract concepts are part of our conceptual system.
(b) Our conceptual system is metaphorically structured.
Conclusion:
(c) Abstract concepts are metaphorically structured.
(38) Premises:
(a) Our conceptual system is metaphorically structured.
(b) The concept argument is part of our conceptual system.
Conclusion:
(c) The concept argument is metaphorically structured.
(39) Premises:
(a) Our conceptual system is metaphorically structured.
(b) 〈Between linguistic expressions and concepts there is such a relationship
that from properties of concepts one may infer properties of linguistic ex-
pressions.〉
Conclusion:
(c) Linguistic expressions are metaphorically structured.
In the case of (39b) obviously the same problem of the invisible part of
the partial basis arises as with (25), therefore the alternatives in (26)
apply here, too. Thus we obtain the situation represented in Figure 14.
At this point we may risk the following conclusions:
Firstly, although the “jump” (Haser 2005) from linguistic expres-
sions to concepts seems to be unmotivated and circular at first sight, this
circularity can be avoided. The reason is that by inferring the existence
of metaphorical concepts from the use of metaphorical expressions and
the use of metaphorical expressions from the existence of metaphorical
concepts, “one indeed returns to ‘the same point’ but does so at a dif-
ferent cognitive level” (Rescher 1987, 119). In particular, the difference
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between the two “cognitive levels” is that whereas one is methodological,
the other is ontological. This finding resolves the circularity: the “jump”
is nothing but a process of cyclic and prismatic revalidation that makes
extensive use of (1) and (2). Therefore, from this point of view, the latter
are effective, rather than ineffective: the gap between the metaphorical
structure of linguistic expressions and the metaphorical structure of con-
cepts can be filled only by the continuous retrospective revision of the
basis, looking for the missing information in the hope that its invisible
parts will eventually become visible.
Secondly, in Lakoff and Johnson’s approach (1) and (2) contribute
to turning the potential circularity of the argumentation into cyclic and
prismatic reasoning.58 Therefore, in this respect they are to be evaluated
as effective.
Thirdly, what Lakoff and Johnson failed to do is the plausibility
analysis of the alternatives which should be expected to specify the “in-
visible premises” in (25), (31) and (39).
Fourthly, in a series of cases even the plausibility of the “visible”
premises can be seriously questioned. For example, several of the claims
which Lakoff and Johnson use as premises clearly overgeneralize (see e.g.,
(28b), (30b)).
58 However, this must not mean that other parts of Lakoff and Johnson’s theory are
not harmfully circular. For example, among the many passages whose circularity
Haser (2005) reveals there may be several which are clear cases not of cyclical
reasoning, but of petitio principii. See also Kertész –Rákosi (2005a).
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 52, 2005
276 andrás kertész – csilla rákosi
In sum, although we tried to show the effective use of (1) and (2) in
Lakoff and Johnson’s reasoning, the question has to be left open whether
the particular handling of the partial basis in a series of other infer-
ences remains within the realm of plausible reasoning or transgresses the
boundary which divides the latter from fallacies.
4.5. Summary
In section 4 we tried to show that in the case of all three theories the use
of the patterns (1) and (2) plays an important heuristic role. That is, we
have obtained the following solution to (P3):
(a)(H3) By the use of (1) and (2) the fallacy of petitio principii can be avoided in
the given contexts in the three theories.
(b) Therefore, the use of (1) and (2) is effective.
(c) Therefore, they work as plausible rather than as fallacious inferences.
5. The solution to (D)
In sections 2–4 we supported the auxiliary hypotheses (H1)–(H3). These,
in turn, yield immediately (H) which is our solution to (P). (H) suggests
the following further considerations:
(i) On the one hand, our analyses imply that with respect to the
structure of inferences we analyzed, a holistic cognitive semantic theory
which explicitly rejects both generativism and modular cognitive linguis-
tics is in reality not as different from the latter as is commonly assumed,
because it uses the same patterns of inference (1) and (2).
(ii) On the other hand, generative linguistics and modular cognitive
linguistic theories compatible with the latter behave in a way radically
different from the way they claim to operate in, because the inferences
they use to support their central hypotheses are far from the standards
of the “received view” of the analytical philosophy of science. In partic-
ular, in opposition to (RVb), it is plausible rather than demonstrative
inferences that these theories rest on.
(iii) We have seen that the standards of rationality which these the-
ories do make use of are essentially different from what (RVa) requires.
(iv) We have also seen that (RVc) is untenable in the case of the
investigated linguistic theories. It is not possible to distinguish sharply
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between “the context of discovery” and “the context of justification”,
because every stage of theory formation is substantially determined by
the use of plausible reasoning.
(v) Moreover, our considerations also witness that the heuristic strate-
gies applied in generative, modular cognitive and holistic cognitive lin-
guistics may make use of patterns of inference which are borderline cases
between plausible reasoning and fallacious inferences. One cannot ex-
clude at the outset that (1) and/or (2) seem to be plausible within one
particular cycle of reasoning, while they turn out to be fallacious in the
context of another cycle, or vice versa. This is a serious difficulty, because
plausible and fallacious inferences differ substantially. In spite of their un-
certainty, plausible inferences are fruitful, progressive and effective tools
of scientific problem solving, while fallacies are destructive.
(vi) We chose very different examples to illustrate the wide applica-
bility of (1) and (2). Thus the problems which the three theories try to
solve with the help of (1) and/or (2) were very different in our analyses.
In our example, Chomsky uses these patterns to establish the philosoph-
ical basis of his linguistic theory. Bierwisch and Lang infer their central
empirical hypotheses via (1) and (2). Lakoff and Johnson make use of
(1) and (2) in a large number of different theoretical contexts.
In the light of these findings there is no doubt that (H) motivates
the complete and comprehensive revaluation of central aspects of theory
formation in linguistics in general and cognitive linguistics in particular.
However, the strength of this insight is substantially weakened by the
fact that we ourselves, too, argued by starting from a partial basis with
invisible premises, and drew plausible inferences from this incomplete
and uncertain informational base. Our own argumentation itself suggests
that in applying the technique of plausible reasoning one is well-advised
to remember Walton’s warning:
“It is vitally important for the user of plausible argument to be open-minded,
steering a mid-path between respecting the facts of a case and asking crit-
ical questions. The two main faults are the extremes of being dogmatic
and leaping too quickly or too firmly to a questionable conclusion. Being
dogmatic is a failure to be open to further dialogue. Leaping too quickly or
too firmly may be a failure to seek more evidence, or even a closure to new
evidence.” (Walton 2001, 164f)
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